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I. INTRODUCTION
Dawn in the Caribbean. Peaceful waters bathe white, pictur-
esque beaches framed by rugged mountains of lush tropical vegeta-
tion. The farms, villages and jungles of Grenada sleep. In the
towns, the winding alleys are empty. The inhabitants of the small
wooden houses which clutch the hillsides are silent. As the last ves-
tiges of nightfall wane, however, the tranquility is violently shat-
tered. At dawn on Tuesday, October 25, 1983, approximately 2,000
troops from the United States, Jamaica, Barbados, Dominica, St.
Lucia, St. Vincent, and Antigua launch an assault upon the island
paradise of Grenada.'
1. The initial assault was a two-prong attack, composed of 500 U.S. Marines landing at
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Prompted by concern for the safety of approximately one
thousand U.S. citizens, the U.S. government closely monitored the
situation in Grenada following the bloody putsch in which Prime
Minister Maurice Bishop was assassinated.' Mr. Bishop, who
seized power in a 1979 coup d'etat, was deposed and placed under
house arrest by security forces led by General Hudson Austin. Sev-
eral days later, on October 19th, Bishop was freed by an unarmed
band of supporters, but, was recaptured almost immediately and
then murdered. General Austin imposed a curfew, closed the is-
land's only commercial airport, and severed most communications
with the outside world. Neighboring Caribbean island states also
watched the situation with increasing alarm.
On October 21st, the members of the little-known Organiza-
tion of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), convened in Barbados.'
The OECS states, relying upon article 8 of the OECS treaty,
which provides for collective measures to protect the common se-
curity of its members, decided to solicit support for an interven-
tion in Grenada. Both Barbados and Jamaica responded positively
to the OECS request.6 On October 24th, the United States joined
the group and agreed to lend the necessary military assistance.
Thus, the scenario was complete for a global superpower, in
conjunction with six other states, to invade one of the world's
smallest independent nations. 7 Naturally, the appearance of such
Pearls Field on the northern end of the island, and 1,000 marines in the south at Point
Salines. Later, the American forces were joined by an additional 400 U.S. troops and 300
military personnel from the Caribbean states. N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1983, at Al, col. 6.
2. Bernard Gwertman, Fear of 'Another Iran' Haunted White House, N.Y. Times, Oct.
26, 1983, at Al, cols. 2-4. The seriousness of the threat to U.S. citizens on Grenada, however,
has been questioned. See John T. McQuiston, School's Chanceller Says Invasion was Not
Necessary to Save Lives, N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1983, at A20, cola. 5-6. Nevertheless, both
Britain and Canada, two countries with significant numbers of citizens on Grenada, ar-
ranged for the air evacuation of their nationals prior to the October 25th invasion. Their
evacuation plans were scuttled, however, by the governments of the invading states. John
Burgess, Canada, Britain Arranged Flights From Grenada for Their Citizens, Wash. Post,
Oct. 27, 1983, at A8, cola. 1-5.
3. Wall St. J., Oct. 21, 1983, § 1 at 1, col. 3; Wall St. J., Oct. 25, 1983, § 1 at 1, col. 3.
4. Pursuant to article 2 of the Treaty Establishing the Organization of Eastern Carib-
bean States [hereinafter cited as OECS Treaty], Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat,
St. Kitts/Nevis, Saint Lucia and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines are the Member States
of OECS.
5. Article 8(4) of the OECS treaty provides for "collective defense and the preservation
of peace and security."
6. The Economist, supra n. 3.
7. Grenada, with a population of approximately 110,000, and a land area of only 133
square miles, is, as aptly noted by President Reagan, about twice the size of the District of
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disproportionate combatants resulted in a flurry of condemnations
of Washington's course of action.8 Despite the American govern-
ment's position that the operation was both necessary to protect
its nationals and justified as a "collective regional action"9 to fill a
"vacuum of responsible governmental authority," 10 world public
opinion questioned Washington's resort to military intervention.
This comment examines the legal theories and arguments
which are applicable in both the defense and condemnation of the
Grenada invasion. Indeed, the legality of military intervention has
long been debated by classical scholars of international law. The
Grenada incident presents an opportunity to analyze the vitality of
the theories of customary international law in a contemporary set-
ting. Moreover, the situation stimulates inquiry into the applica-
tion of the Charters of the United Nations (UN) and the Organiza-
tion of American States (OAS) in the volatile political tinderboxes
of the eighties. The Grenada invasion may offer some suggestions
regarding the future vitality and usefulness of those documents,
and the present role of those organizations vis-h-vis regional and
sub-regional blocks of states. Grenada 1983 may invite new inter-
pretations of these organizational charters which are more consis-
tent with superpower aims and political realities. The aftermath of
the Grenada invasion presents an illustration of the initial actions,
reactions and interworkings of the international organizations con-
fronted with a crisis.
Columbia. Transcript of Address by President on Lebanon and Grenada, N.Y. Times, Oct.
25, 1983, at A9, cols. 1-6.
8. The United States action was criticized not only by Nicaragua, Cuba, and the Soviet
Union, but also by American allies such as Canada, Great Britain, France, West Germany,
Italy, and most Latin American States. See, N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1983, at A17, cols. 1-2;
N.Y. Times, Oct 26, 1983 at A19, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1983 at A20, cols. 4-6; N.Y.
Times, October 27, 1983, at A21, cols. 1-4; Wash. Post, Oct. 27, 1983 at A8, col. 4; Wash.
Post, Oct. 27, 1983 at As, cols. 1-5; Wash. Post, October 27, 1983 at A9, cols. 1-4. In addi-
tion, the United States was condemned by fifteen of the members of the Organization of
American States (OAS) at an emergency meeting of the organization on October 26th.
Wash. Post, Oct. 27, 1983, at A9, cols. 1-3. Indeed, the world-wide anti-American sentiment
was reflected by the lopsided vote in the United Nations' General Assembly, in which a
resolution deploring the Grenada invasion was adopted by a vote of 108 to 9 with 27
abstentions.
9. Statement of Jeanne J. Kirkpatrick, (United States of America), S/PV.2491, 28 Oct.
1983, 28 at 37.
10. Id. at 38.
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II. BACKGROUND
In 1979, the New Jewel Movement"' came to power after the
first revolution in the English-speaking Caribbean under the lead-
ership of Prime Minister Maurice Bishop.12 Bishop overthrew the
government of Prime Minister Eric Gairy, which had been in con-
trol since Grenada's independence from Great Britain in 1974, by
seizing the government radio station and proclaiming the authority
of a revolutionary government in a virtually bloodless coup.'" In
attaining popular approval, Bishop promised a corruption-free so-
ciety based on a constitutional government." The New Jewel
Movement never achieved its aims, however, as popular elections
were never held, the press was stifled and any effective political
opposition was prohibited. 1
Once in power, Bishop readily accepted Cuban aid, 6 and, dur-
ing his rule, both Cuba and the Soviet Union established a strong
presence in Grenada. 7 Pursuant to a 1979 treaty, Cuba agreed to
provide between $40 and $60 million in funds, labor and materials
to assist in the construction of a large new airport with a 9,000
foot-long runway.' 8 With Cuban and Soviet assistance, Bishop re-
built the one-kilowatt Radio Grenada into a 75-kilowatt station
that had the capacity to broadcast throughout the Caribbean.'
The government also shifted news sources from the British Broad-
casting Corporation to the Soviet TASS and Cuba's Prensa Latina
and renamed the station "Radio Free Grenada."20 Grenada devel-
oped its military capacity considerably pursuant to military agree-
ments with Cuba, the Soviet Union and North Korea."' In con-
11. The word "Jewel" is an acronym for the terms "Joint Endeavor for Welfare, Educa-
tion and Liberation." N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1983, at AS, col. 2.
12. N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1983, at A3, col. 1.
13. N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1983, at As, col. 2.
14. Id. at AS, col. 1.
15. Id. In fact, Bishop suspended the 1973 Grenadian Constitution in 1979 by unilater-
ally legislating through the promulgation of a series of "People's Laws". See American Bar
Association, Section of International Law and Practice, Report of the Committee on Gre-
nada, January 25, 1984. (Unpublished Report) [hereinafter cited as A.B.A. Report].
16. N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1983 at AS, col. 2.
17. N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1983, at A3, col. 1.
18. A.B.A. Report, supra note 15 at 3.
19. Id. at 2.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 3. In fact, by the fall of 1983, Grenada had a regular army of 600 men and a
militia estimated to include between 1,500 and 3,000 men. Cuba and the Soviet Union had
provided Grenada with military equipment, sophisticated arms and military and intelligence
training. Further, plans discovered during the invasion disclosed an intention to increase
1984]
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trast, Bishop had remained distant to the United States
government, refusing to establish diplomatic relations and claiming
that the United States had tried to destabilize his government.22 In
the spring of 1983, however, Bishop changed his policy and trav-
elled to Washington where he spoke with several members of the
Reagan administration in an attempt to justify his program for
Grenada.28 On June 4, 1983, Bishop announced the establishment
of a five-member commission to draft a new constitution.2'
During the summer of 1983, dissension surfaced and a split
within Grenada's Central Committee seemed imminent.25 At the
committee meetings from September 14 through 16, a proposal to
shift power from Bishop to Deputy Prime Minister Bernard Coard
was approved.2 6 The proposal to depose Bishop was reportedly rat-
ified by the rest of the ruling party on September 25th 7
On Wednesday, October 12, 1983, the disputes over Bishop's
willingness to share his power with other members of the Central
Committee continued.28 Several Committee members, led by Dep-
uty Prime Minister Coard, seized control and placed Bishop under
house arrest at his official residence.2 9 Several other cabinet minis-
ters and political leaders who were sympathetic to Bishop's views
and policies were also detained when the balance of power
shifted. 0 On Friday, October 15, 1983, Deputy Prime Minister
Coard resigned, reportedly in an attempt to dispel rumors that he
was involved in a plot to kill Bishop. 1 Bishop had apparently been
given twenty-four hours to resign from his position as Prime Min-
ister on Wednesday, October 13th, but, failed to do so."2
On Sunday, October 16, 1983, Major Liam Cornwall, a military
Grenada's armed forces to between 7,000 and 10,000 men in the near future.
22. N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1983, at A8, col. 2.
23. Id.
24. N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1983, at A10, col. 2.
26. A.B.A. Report, supra note 15 at 3-4. The Minutes of the sessions of the Central
Committee in both July and August exhibited that dissention. In fact, at the committee
meeting on August 29th, Bishop was openly denounced for contributing to the political split
and for his failure to uniformly and staunchly support the Marxist-Leninist position. Id.
26. Id. Deputy Prime Minister Coard had long criticized Bishop for failing to socialize
Grenada fast enough and for encouraging the development of private enterprise. N.Y.
Times, Oct. 18, 1983, at A3, col. 4.
27. A.B.A. Report, supra note at 4.
28. N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1983, at A5, col. 5.
29. N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1983, at A3, col. 4.
30. N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1983, at A3, col. 2.
31. N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1983, at A10, col. 2.
32. Id.
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leader and the Grenadian Ambassador to Cuba, read a statement
on Radio Free Grenada stating that the army had taken control
and that Bishop had been deposed.38 On Monday, October 17,
1983, the commander of the military, General Hudson Austin,
stated that Prime Minister Bishop was "at home and quite safe"
but would be turned out of office unless he shared his power with
Deputy Prime Minister Coard, in a broadcast on the official
Grenadian radio station."" The Grenadian army, numbering ap-
proximately three thousand soldiers had been mobilized by a
broadcast ordering all members of the security forces to report to
their bases.85
On Wednesday, October 19, 1983, a crowd of approximately
four thousand pro-Bishop demonstrators protested in the streets of
the capital, St. George's, demanding Bishop's release.8 When no
response was forthcoming, they swarmed toward Bishop's official
residence where they freed him by force.87 Bishop and his support-
ers then proceeded to the army headquarters at Fort Rupert where
Bishop convinced the soldiers to put down their weapons.88 Within
moments, an armed personnel carrier, driven by Deputy Prime
Minister Coard's hard-line supporters pulled up, pointed its high-
powered machine gun at the crowd and then fired randomly into
the masses.89 Once the crowd was under the military's control,
Bishop and several of his cabinet members and sympathetic union
leaders were seized, removed from the public's view, and
executed.40
Within hours, General Hudson Austin declared himself to be
the head of Grenada's new Revolutionary Military Council."' Aus-
tin then imposed a twenty-four hour, shoot-on-sight curfew.'2 The
Council also closed the airport, decreed the imposition of strict
censorship of all publications and banned all foreign journalists
from entering Grenada.4 Several Caribbean nations, including Ja-
33. Id. at Al, col. 3.
34. N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1983, at A3, col. 4.
35. N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1983, at A10, col. 2.
36. N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1983, at A3, col. 1.
37. Id. at A3, col. 2.
38. N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1983, at A8, col. 5.
39. Time, Nov. 14, 1983, at 21, col. 3.
40. Wash. Post, Oct. 21, 1983, at A25, col. 2.
41. Id. at Al, col. 1.
42. Id. at A25, col. 1. The curfew was not absolute in that it allowed workers in "essen-
tial services" to move around the island if they obtained passes to do so. Id.
43. N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 1983, at A13, col. 2.
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maica and Barbados, publicly denounced the events in Grenada
and refused to recognize the Council's authority."
On Friday, October 21, 1983, the seven-nation Organization of
Eastern Caribbean States met in Barbados to discuss the events in
Grenada.45 The representatives of the member states unanimously
agreed that the situation in Grenada warranted OECS action; how-
ever, only four members voted in favor of military action, pursuant
to article 8 of the OECS treaty, and two members abstained.4 Gre-
nada, a founding member of the organization, was not represented
at the discussions in Barbados.4 7 Allegedly with the safety of ap-
proximately one thousand U.S. citizens on Grenada in mind, the
United States government ordered a ten-ship, 1,900-man task
force, originally headed for Lebanon, to proceed towards Grenada
to be available for a potential evacuation of United States
citizens.'
On Saturday, October 22, 1983, two United States diplomats
were permitted onto Grenada to investigate any potential dangers
to United States citizens.49 The government radio station broad-
cast statements that the island was calm, but, repeatedly warned
that a "military invasion of our country is imminent."50 General
Austin told the Chancellor of the Medical School that the curfew
would be lifted at six A.M., Monday, October 24th, and that the
airport would be opened and "everyone would be free to come and
go."51 Early Saturday, the Organization of Eastern Caribbean
States formally requested the United States and other friendly na-
tions to participate in a regional security force which was being
created under article 8 of their charter to invade Grenada and re-
move the potential threat to the peace and security of the region."
The force was allegedly created upon the invitation of Grenada's
Governor General, Sir Paul Scoon, "to enter Grenada and restore
order."53
On Sunday, October 23, 1983, the Revolutionary Military
44. Wash. Post, Oct. 21, 1983, at A25, col. 2.
45. N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 1983, at A13, col. 2.
46. A.B.A. Report, supra note 15, at 5.
47. Id.
48. N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1983, at Al, col. 3.
49. N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1983, at Al, col. 3.
50. Id.
51. Id. at A12, col. 1.
52. N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1983, at A16, col. 6.
53. A.B.A. Report, supra note 15 at 5.
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Council placed the armed forces on alert and called upon the mili-
tia reserves in anticipation of an imminent invasion by the foreign
forces stationed off the Grenadian coast. s4 The Council agreed to
allow several charter flights from Barbados to land on Grenada the
next day to evacuate British and Canadian citizens.55 The charter
line cancelled the flights, however, when it was notified by the Car-
ibbean leaders who were meeting in Barbados that they had de-
cided to suspend all air and sea links with Grenada.56
At approximately two P.M. on Monday, October 24, 1983, the
United States Embassy in Barbados received a diplomatic note
from General Austin promising that all United States citizens in
Grenada would be safe.5 ' The telex explicitly stated that "the lives,
well-being and property of every American . . . [is] fully protected
and guaranteed by our government." The message continued by
affirming that "any American ... who desires to leave Grenada for
whatever reason can freely do so. . . through our airport and com-
mercial aircraft. 5 8 Although the airport was still closed at that
point, the message promised that Grenada would be responsive to
any flights, commercial or charter, and that it would "facilitate
them in any way."59
The telex went on to state that "the Revolutionary Military
Council . . . has no desire or aspiration to rule the country." 0 It
also noted that measures were being taken to establish a "fully
constituted civilian government within 10 to 14 days." ' In fact,
under article 57 of the Grenada constitution, authority on the is-
land was vested in the Governor General, Sir Paul Scoon.2
On Monday night, the United States formally agreed to join
the multi-national force in invading Grenada. 3 At approximately
five A.M. on Tuesday, October 25, 1983, the multi-national force
began its assault on the island.64
54. N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1983, at A16, col. 4.
55. Wash. Post, Oct. 24, 1983, at A4, col. 4.
56. See supra note 2.
57. Wash. Post, Oct. 27, 1983, at A8, col. 2.
58. U.N. SCOR (2487 7th Mtg) at 43 (1983).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at pp. 44-45.
62. Id.
63. Wash. Post, Oct. 27, 1983, at A9, col. 3.
64. N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1983, at A16, col. 6.
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III. THE INITIAL POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES
During his speech of Thursday, October 27, 1983,65 President
Reagan stated that the United States had participated in the inva-
sion of Grenada at the "urgent request" of the Organization of
Eastern Caribbean States."' The stated purpose of the invasion
was to "assist in the restoration of law and order and of govern-
mental institutions to the island of Grenada." 67 The President
found that protecting the lives and personal safety of American
citizens was of such "overriding importance" as to justify military
action.68
Secretary of State George P. Shultz held a press conference on
October 25th during which he noted that there was "no responsible
government" in Grenada, leading figures had been arrested, and
there was a shoot-on-sight curfew in effect.69 He stated that the
basis of the Reagan administration's concern for the safety of
United States citizens on Grenada was that there was a dangerous
"vacuum of authority" in conjunction with violent conditions."
President Reagan stated that, although there was no present dan-
ger to the Americans on the island, many wanted to leave, the air-
ports were closed and he felt that it was necessary to take decisive
action rather than to wait for something to happen."
The United States' legal position on the validity of the inva-
sion is based on two different and distinct theories. The primary
justification advanced by the Reagan administration was that the
U.S. forces were participating in an act of collective self-defense
under article 8 of the OECS charter. 2 In a State Department legal
memorandum, the U.S. took the position that the invasion was
"consistent with" both the UN and OAS charters because each al-
lows for "collective action pursuant to regional security treaties in
response to threats to peace and security. '78
65. N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1983, at Al, col. 5.
66. President Reagan spoke in a nationally televised address on the evening of October
27, 1983. A verbatim transcript of the speech appeared in N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1983, at A9,
cols. 1-6.
67. Id.
68. Wash. Post, Oct. 26, 1983, at A7, col. 1.
69. Id.
70. N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1983, at A18, col. 3.
71. Id.
72. Wash. Post, Oct. 26, 1983, at A7, col. 4.
73. U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. 2487 at 96, 10/25/83.
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The OECS contended that it was responding to the fact that
"conditions in institutions of authority had degenerated [and] that
a climate of fear, anxiety and acute danger to personal safety ex-
isted on the island." 7' It felt that the "dangerous vacuum of au-
thority constituted an unprecedented threat to the peace and se-
curity of the entire Eastern Caribbean. 7 5 In her address to the UN
Security Council, Mrs. Kirkpatrick, the U.S. Ambassador, stated
that the action was "reasonable and proportionate" to the threat
posed by the deterioration of authority in Grenada and the threat
it posed to the region. 6
Mrs. Kirkpatrick also claimed that the invasion was "consis-
tent with the purposes and principles" of both the UN and OAS
charters because "it aims only at the restoration of conditions of
law and order fundamental to the enjoyment of basic human
rights.""' The concept of intervention to protect human rights is
central to the second U.S. justification: the necessity of protecting
U.S. citizens.78 While the administration noted that this rationale
would justify a "limited evacuation mission" it apparently realized
that it could not justify the occupation of the entire island pending
the creation of a new government."
IV. SELF-DEFENSE
A. Introduction
The content of a legal norm evolves in a changing society.
Treaties and agreements which attempt to create such norms must
be amended, officially re-interpreted or revoked to retain their
ability to govern in a changing world. The body of international
law pertaining to the use of force has remained largely unchanged
in the last 35 years and the instruments which created that body of
law, although frequently discussed and debated, have substantially
survived in their original form. Eventually, when the legal frame-
work, and therefore, the norms it encompasses, becomes outdated,
failing even to provide for some of its explicitly-stated central pur-
poses, state practice will reflect a wanton disregard for the limita-
74. N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1983, at A22, col. 1.
75. See supra note 73 at 96.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See supra note 74 at col. 2.
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tions imposed and nations will act as they choose leaving discus-
sions of "legality" and potential justifications for scholars and
theoreticians helplessly gazing at the glowing aftermath.
This may be precisely the fate of the United Nations 0 in its
role as global peacekeeper. Today's world is based on global super-
powers dominating their zones of influence by whatever means
necessary while maintaining only the facade of international com-
ity and respect for traditional norms of international law. The
United States participation in the Grenada invasion exhibits just
such erosion of the traditional respect for international obligations
and rules of conduct when they clash with foreign policy
objectives.
B. The Customary Law Right of Self-Defense
Self-defense is an exception to the general prohibition on the
use of force. It is, therefore, one criterion to determine the "legal-
ity" of a state's actions. A legitimate exercise of the right of self-
defense provides a certain amount of justification for a use of force
which would otherwise violate international law. Bowett noted that
the purpose of the right of self-defense is "to justify action, other-
wise illegal, which is necessary to protect certain essential rights of
the state against violation by other states.""1
Grotius stated that the origin of the right was in "the fact that
nature commits to each his own protection, not in the injustice or
crime of the aggressor." ' As the law developed, self-defense was a
wide concept which was virtually unrestricted. The natural law
right of self-defense allowed "any individual, or a state, to defend
his person, property, or honor against a real or imminent attack." 8
The basis of the modern concept of the right of self-defense is
derived, in large part, not from the writings of philosophers and
theorists, but rather from a protest note from U.S. Secretary of
State Daniel Webster to the British government in the Caroline
80. The same rationale applies to every regional and sub-regional organization, like the
OAS and the OECS which performs similar functions in attempting to maintain peace and
security in its section of the globe.
81. Bowm-r, SELF DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 270 (1958).
82. GRaorius, DE JuRn BELLI Ac PAcis 172 (F. Kelsey trans. 1925).
83. VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW, Bk. II, ch. IV
(1758) in THE CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 130 (G. Fenwick trans. 1916) (J.B. Scott
ed.).
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incident in 1837.84 The note stated that the British government
had the obligation to prove "[the] necessity of self-defense, instant,
overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and leaving no moment
for deliberation"8 5 to justify their actions in destroying an Ameri-
can ship. Webster's note also required that the act be shown to be
proportional to the danger, in expressly expecting the British to
show that they "did nothing unreasonable and excessive; since the
act justified by the necessity of self-defense, must be limited to
that necessity, and kept clearly within it."'"
Customary international law permitted anticipatory action in
response to imminent danger.8 7 The Caroline doctrine was inter-
preted to allow preventative action where self-defense was found to
constitute self-preservation."8 One commentator, in defining self-
preservation, which he considered to be synonymous with the right
of self-defense, noted that "a state may defend itself, by preventive
[sic] means if in its conscientious judgment necessary, against at-
tack by another State, threat of attack, or preparations or other
conduct from which an intention to attack may reasonably be ap-
prehended." ' According to some scholars, the customary interna-
tional law right of anticipatory self-defense was allegedly qualified
by the dearth of occasions where it was relied upon in the period
from 1920 to 1939.90
The customary international law right of self-defense was also
limited by the requirement that the amount of force used must be
proportional to the intensity of the challenge and the immediacy of
the danger.9 Although this limitation is an indispensable compo-
nent of the traditional justification for self-defense, it was neither
84. The underlying facts in the Caroline case were that a U.S. ship, the Caroline, was
standing by in American waters to carry insurgents who were preparing to attack Canada.
During the night of December 29, 1837, British forces crossed the Niagara river and de-
stroyed the ship. Jennings, The Caroline and the McLeod cases, AM. J. INT'L L. 32 (1938).
85. H.R. EXEC. Doc. Nos. 302 & 73, 25th Cong., 2d Sess. (1837).
86. Id.
87. BowTr, supra note 81 at 31, 58, 256; Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force
by Individual States in International Law 81 RxcUEIL DES CowRs 463 (Hague Academy of
Int'l L.) (1952); P. JEssup, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 166 (1948).
88. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OP FORCE BY STATES 257 (1963). The
right of self-preservation allows states to resort to force to protect their existence as states.
It has been interpreted to be a narrower form of necessity justifying acts of war. Id. at 41-
43.
89. WESTLAKE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 299 (1904).
90. BROWNLIE, supra note 88 at 259. Brownlie also noted its absence in treaties of mu-
tual assistance during that period. Id.
91. Id. at 261.
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mentioned nor applied with any frequency until the period of the
League of Nations.e2 Professor Waldock thus found that there were
three main requirements for a legitimate exercise of self-defense
under customary international law
(1) An actual infringement or threat of infringement of the
rights of the defending State;
(2) A failure or inability on the part of the other State to use
its own legal powers to stop or prevent the infringement; and,
(3) Acts of self-defense strictly confined to the object of stop-
ping or preventing the infringement and reasonably proportion-
ate to what is required for achieving this object."
In applying this test to determine whether the U.S. action in
Grenada was within the parameters of the customary law right of
self-defense it appears clear that there are some serious questions
as to whether a use of force was justified even under this least
strenuous barrier. First, was any right of the U.S. actually in-
fringed or even threatened? If not, can the U.S. rely on the threat
to the region and therefore to the hemisphere, of which the U.S. is
an integral part? The U.S. position is centered around the threat
to the region created by the "vacuum of responsible authority" in
Grenada coupled with the violent conditions and the dominant po-
sition of Grenada's armed forces in the region." In light of the dis-
covery of warehouses filled with Russian rifles and military sup-
plies and the presence of over six hundred Cuban advisors ready to
"defend the fatherland"1 in response to the invasion, the position
is not totally untenable. Further, the extension of Grenada's mili-
tary presence to the nearby islands exhibited a certain amount of
preparation for attempts to strengthen its position in the Eastern
Caribbean." The imminence of the threat is, however, a question
92. Id.
93. Waldock, supra note 87 at 463-64. Waldock reached this conclusion after discussing
the vitality of the standards set out in the Caroline case and noting that those standards set
the proper limits of a "plea of self-defense." Id.
94. N.Y. Times, supra note 21. If one considers the minute forces of each of the East-
ern Caribbean states next to those of Grenada, the imbalance is indeed in threatening pro-
portions. See statement of Miss Charles (Dominica) S/PV 2489 at 7, 26 October 1983.
95. N.Y. Times, supra note 65. The Cubans present on Grenada at the time of the
invasion were prepared to fight to the death to "defend the fatherland" after they received a
communication from Fidel Castro on October 25, 1983. Id.
96. Wash. Post, supra note 57. U.S. forces captured small bands of Grenadians on the
nearby islands which are approximately three and five miles off the coast of Grenada. Al-
though they didn't actually amount to anything that could be construed as a potential inva-
sion force, their capture (or discovery) mandates consideration of the possibility.
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of fact as the Revolutionary Military Council barely had control of
Grenada and was, in all likelihood, in no position to begin attack-
ing other nations. 7 Further, the only mobilization of the military
was to fend off an "imminent invasion" by the U.S. forces standing
by offshore for a potential evacuation of U.S. citizens."'
It seems likely, however, that if the Council (either alone or
with Cuban and/or Soviet input) determined that its absolute grip
on the power in Grenada provided a perfect opportunity to expand
its influence in the region there would be nothing to really hinder
it.99 The real question raised under Waldock's test is whether an
all-out invasion was proportional to the threat posed by even a hy-
pothetical imminent attack. A positive response is inherently pre-
mised upon the belief that Grenada not only had the ability to
launch a similar attack on one of its neighbors, but that it had
already made the preparations to do so.100 Even in light of Gre-
nada's burgeoning military might, revolutionary leadership and en-
couragement from expansionist allies, it seems unlikely that the
revolutionary council could have mounted a massive attack on
even its closest neighbor. Further, even though Grenada possessed
military forces approximately equivalent to those of the invasion
force, the bulk of those soldiers were necessary to impose the cur-
few and maintain control of the population. It is, therefore, diffi-
cult to contend that the invasion was in response to a truly immi-
nent threat and that it was in fact proportional to that threat and
thus can be justified as an act of self-defense under customary in-
ternational law.
Although customary international law included the ability to
engage in anticipatory self-defense, it provided no justification for
mutual defense unless such action was pursuant to an agreement
or some sort of proximate relationship with the threatened
party.101 Some scholars assert that each participant in an act of
collective defense must have a right to act in such a manner indi-
97. The imposition of the 24-hour, shoot-on-sight curfew clearly shows the extreme
measures they had to take to retain their control over the populous, N.Y. Times, supra note
43.
98. N.Y. Times, supra note 54.
99. Therefore, the second requirement of Waldock's test is easily met in that Grenada
was unable at that point in time to "use its own legal powers to stop or prevent the infringe-
ment." Waldock, supra note 87 at 463-64.
100. An argument can be made, however, that preventative action is permissable under
the third prong of the test, but, traditional applications of this theory require the threat to
be truly imminent.
101. BowEr, supra note 81 at 202.
19841
68 INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
vidually.'0 2 Alternatively they point to state practice, like that of
the U.S. pursuant to the Monroe Doctrine, wherein a proximate
relationship was inferred for any use of force in the hemisphere
under the belief that U.S. "security was so dependent on the secur-
ity of the American Continent as a whole that any attack upon
that continent would jeopardize U.S. interests to such an extent as
to afford to the United States the right of self-defense."108 Al-
though this theory has been extended to cover a wide variety of
actions, it is probably inapplicable to the U.S. action in Grenada as
the underlying infringement of rights is tenuous.
C. Self-Defense Under the U.N. Charter
1. GENERAL PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF FORCE
The preamble to the U.N. Charter reflects the drafter's central
goals - "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war"
and "to insure. . . that armed force shall not be used, save in the
common interest.' 0 4 In order to accomplish those objectives, arti-
cle 2(3) requires all members to "settle their international disputes
by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and
security. . . are not endangered."' 05 Article 2(4) expressly promul-
gates the norm prohibiting unilateral uses of force in stating that
"[aIll members shall refrain in their international relations from
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or politi-
cal independence of any state or in any manner inconsistent with
the Purposes of the United Nations."' 0' Although this prohibition
appears to be virtually absolute, state practice and scholarly inter-
pretations have weakened its value as a constraint.
Scholars and theorists contemplating the law pertaining to the
use of force in the post-UN Charter era are sharply divided into
two contrasting schools of thought. The restrictionists, scholars
such as Brownlie, Kelsen and Jessup, assert that the UN Charter
must be read in a narrow, literal fashion and that force may be
102. Id. at 206. Bowett, conversely, also takes the right further, however, in noting that
any state can invoke their right of self-defense to defend "the substantive rights for which
self-defense is a permissable means of protection." Id. This may be interpreted to allow any
state to use any means to defend any of these rights anywhere as long as they do so within
the parameters of the Caroline test.
103. Id. at 209.
104. U.N, CHARTER PREAMBLE.
105. U.N, CHARTER, art. 2(3).
106. U.N. CHARTER, art. 2(4).
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used only in conformity with charter constraints and mechanisms.
The realist position, as espoused by such commentators as 'Bowett,
Waldock and McDougal and Feliciano, is that due to political real-
ities, changes in the methods of using force and the frequent inef-
fectiveness of the charter mechanism, the provisions prohibiting
the use of force must be interpreted flexibly.
The restrictionists assert that any use of force by a member
state is unlawful, regardless of the dangers or disputes which pro-
voked it, unless (1) it is in justifiable self-defense against an
"armed attack", or (2) it is part of a "collective action" pursuant to
a decision of the relevant organ of the United Nations.'07 Professor
Brownlie buttressed this view on the drafter's central concern with
controlling unilateral uses of force. He noted that:
... the general tendency was towards a restrictive interpreta-
tion of any permission in relation to the use of force. Delegations
were concerned that the Organization should have a near mo-
nopoly [on the] use of force and the wide terms of paragraph 4
reflect the emphasis on prohibition rather than permission.10'
Conversely, the realists contend that individual intervention is
available to protect rights which are illegally denied or to defend
nationals or territory when collective forms of relief are unavaila-
ble. 00 Succinctly stated, they assert that "[i]f the collective organi-
zation, through a fault in its organizing instrument, leaves a gap
where the use of force is necessary but the collective organization
is impotent to act, then the legal right to use force must, in such
instance, revert back to the members."'1 0
2. THE SELF-DEFENSE EXCEPTION - ARTICLE 51
Article 51 of the UN Charter provides the principal exception
to the general prohibition on the use of force. The article explicitly
allows member states to retain their "inherent right of individual
or collective self-defense.""' The terms of the article expressly at-
tempt to limit that right, however, as the article provides that a
107. See R.J. VINCENT, NONINTERVENTION AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER 310 (1974).
108. BROWNLIB, eupra note 88 at 270. He also noted that several of the drafters wanted
to require the organization to authorize any uses of force before they would be considered
lawful.
109. See J. STONE, AoGsRSSION AND WORLD ORDER 94-95 (1958).
110. A. THOMAS & A. THOMAS, NoN-INTERVENTION, THE LAW AND ITS IMPORT IN THE
AmERICAS 208 (1956).
111. U.N. CHARTER, art. 51.
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use of force in self defense is only permissible where "an armed
attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations" and is re-
stricted to the period "until the Security Council has taken mea-
sures necessary to maintain international peace and security." '
The provision also requires member states to notify the Security
Council immediately upon exercising this right and attempts to
maintain the autonomy of organizational action in stating that acts
of self defense "shall not in any way affect the authority and re-
sponsibility of the Security Council . . . to restore or maintain in-
ternational peace and security." '
Because article 51 explicitly recognizes the existence of an "in-
herent right" of self-defense, realist commentators contend that
the phrase itself accepts and incorporates the customary interna-
tional law right of self-defense into the UN Charter System. 4
They point to the negotiating history at San Francisco and the use
of broader terms 5 which are more flexible in the official texts in
other languages. The realists also rely on portions of the travaux
pr~paratoires to support their position."" They point to the fact
that the purpose of even explicitly including the provision was to
clarify the official position regarding collective agreements for self-
defense.11 7 Further, the realists believe that member states retain
all of their customary international law rights except those that
they have surrendered in assuming their obligations under the
U.N. Charter. 18
As noted above, the restrictionists believe that article 51's ex-
ception to the prohibition on the use of force should be read in a
narrow, literal fashion, permitting actions in self-defense only in
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. BowErr, supra note 81 at 185; Waldock, supra note 87 at 498.
115. For example, the French text uses the term "aggression arme" which includes,
but is not limited to, armed attacks.
116. One of the committee reports in the travaux states that the "use of arms in legiti-
mate self-defense remains admitted and unimpaired" under the Charter. Doc. 944, I/1/34(1),
6 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 459 (1945). The restrictionists traditionally counter any reliance on the
Travaux with the general principle that if the text is clear, no reliance can be placed on
them. See generally BROWNLIE, supra note 88 at 267-68.
117. Waldock, supra note 87 at 497. The drafters were particularly concerned with
maintaining the vitality of the Inter-American system of mutual defense which existed at
that point in time under the Act of Chapultepec. Id. See also GOODRICH, HAMBRO & SIMONS
CHARTER OP THE UNITED NATIONS, 348 (1969).
118. Bowrr, supra note 81 stated that "[W]e must presume that rights formerly be-
longing to member states continue except in so far as obligations inconsistent with those
existing rights are assumed under the Charter." Id. at 184-185.
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response to an "armed attack" or within a collective action taken
pursuant to decisions by competent organs of the UN.' There-
fore, they believe that the broad customary law right of self-de-
fense does not survive the ratification of the UN Charter."'0 Fur-
ther, they contend that reliance on the travaux pr~paratoires must
be conditioned by the numerous statements regarding the broad
prohibition against the use of force in article 2(4) and its central
position in the purposes of the UN Charter. 2 ' Thus, in light of
these contrasting theoretical positions, it is a burden, however min-
imal it may be, to assert that the customary international law right
of self-defense survived the adoption of the UN Charter intact. In-
deed, the arguments even seem moot under these particular cir-
cumstances as the invasion was probably unjustifiable, even under
customary international law.
3. COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE UNDER THE U.N. CHARTER
Article 51 also mentions "collective self-defense"' 2 explicitly,
thus providing for the existence of regional organizations or mutual
agreements created with collective self defense as their express or
central purpose. 23 The realists assert that the right was purpose-
fully removed from Chapter VIII of the UN Charter to remove the
limitations placed on any potential actions by regional organiza-
tions by article 52.'1" They believe that the right extends to all
collective defense organizations, regional and contractual, and that
it even includes the ability to assist any nation, regardless of a
membership in the UN, in a legitimate exercise of its right of self-
defense.1 25 In contrast, the restrictionists believe that member
states can only assist other member states, regardless of their obli-
gations under other regional arrangements, because their obliga-
tion to refrain from using force under article 2(4) is superior to
obligations outside the UN Charter.' 2 The restrictionists do, how-
119. H. KELSEN, LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 791-800 (1950); Brownlie, supra note 88
at 271-72.
120. BROWNLIE, supra note 88 at 265.
121. Id. at 268 note 6. Brownlie believes that the "narrow and precise terms [of article
51] are explicable against the background of the general prohibition" in article 2(4). Id. at
271-72.
122. U.N. CHARTER, art. 51.
123. Waldock, supra note 87 at 497.
124. Id. at 503-04.
125. Id. at 504.
126. KELSEN supra note 119 at 916-17. Kelsen supports the' proposition by noting that
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ever, support the proposition that member states can participate in
regional organizations or collective defense agreements insofar as
its obligations do not conflict with either its responsibilities under
the Charter or the authority of the Security Council.'" Therefore,
although the OECS members that requested U.S. assistance in de-
fending themselves are members of the UN and are participating
in an arguably legitimate regional organization, their failure to act
in a way that was consistent with UN mechanisms12 8 is a fatal flaw
in attempting to justify the invasion as an act of "collective self-
defense".
4. ANTICIPATORY SELF-DEFENSE UNDER THE U.N. CHARTER
The realists contend that the right of anticipatory self-defense
is not limited by the phrase "if an armed attack occurs" in article
51 because such an interpretation would reduce the scope of the
customary international law right of self-defense. 129 Bowett sug-
gests that an armed attack is only one event which can trigger the
right of self-defense. 1 0 Others maintain that such a limited phras-
ing was not intended by the drafters.181 Some commentators note
that, in an age of nuclear capabilities, giving the aggressor the au-
tomatic prerogative to strike the first blow allows those who breach
their duties under the U.N. Charter to obliterate those who comply
with them.182 Waldock supports that proposition by arguing that if
the action of the U.N. is obstructed, delayed or just plain inade-
quate, and the threat is imminent, then it is a "travesty of the
purposes of the charter to compel a defending state to allow its
assailant to deliver the first and perhaps fatal blow." '
The restrictionists read the language literally in finding the
phrase "if an armed attack occurs" to mean "after an armed at-
tack occurs."'1 4 Further, they assert that an "armed attack" means
article 103 of the U.N. Charter provides that charter obligations are superior to all other
obligations. Id.
127. Id.
128. See infra, section IV C.5 at pp. 22-27.
129. Wadock, supra note 87 498. As noted above, Waldock points to the more flexible
phrasing in the French text and the fact that Article 51 is positioned in Chap. VIII, etc.
130. BOWETr, supra note 81 at 191-192.
131. McDOUGAL & FELICIANo, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, 235-39 (1961).
132. Waldock, supra note 87 at 498.
133. Id.
134. KELSEN, supra note 119 at pp. 269, 797, Henkin, supra at 232, BROWNLIE, supra
note 88 at 265 and Jassup, supra note 87, at 166. Professor Myles McDougal phrased their
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literally that and is therefore not subject to more flexible interpre-
tations which encompass imminent threats of attack and other
types of aggression based on subversion, political propaganda and/
or the incitement and training of insurgents.13 5 Both groups, how-
ever, agree that even if the customary law right of anticipatory
self-defense is recognized, it can only be exercised in response to a
genuine and absolutely imminent threat."' One commentator re-
duced the requirement to tangible terms in noting that:
the danger of obliteration of the threatened state must be real,
the threatening state must be in a position to obliterate the
threatened state, the threatening state must have the means to
obliterate the threatened state, and there must be sufficient evi-
dence to support the belief of the intended victim that the
threatening state made the decision to attack.'""
In delineating such stringent standards for justifying an anticipa-
tory use of force, Professor Rohlik contended that "in the vast ma-
jority of cases when anticipatory self-defense was invoked, the self
proclaimed victim not only had sufficient time for deliberations,
but any threat of armed attack which could lead to its obliteration
was far less than credible.""la' He cites the Israeli initiation of hos-
tilities in the 1967 "Six Day War" as the only example of an act of
anticipatory self defense which can be justified under the U.N.
Charter because "there was a threat of imminent armed attack and
a reasonable presumed intention of the threatening state to de-
stroy the intended victim, the threatening state was assumed to
have means to carry out its intention, and there were not suffi-
position in noting that "the proponents of a [restrictive] interpretation substitute for the
words 'if an armed attack occurs' the very different words 'if, and only if, an armed attack
occurs,'" McDougal, The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine and Self-Defen8e, 57 AM. J. INT'L L.
597, 600 (1963).
135. Brownlie, as a major proponent of the restrictionist position views the phrase
"armed attack" to actually require a trespass into the geographical territory of another
state. Brownlie, supra note 88 at 255-6. This is consistent with the view that self-defense
must be in response to delictual conduct see Bowett, supra note 81 at 185. While the realists
agree that imminent threats or delictual conduct is a necessary prerequisite to unilateral
action, their definitions of those concepts are broad enough to include a variety of acts of
aggression short of actually using military force. See Bowwrr, supra note 81 at Chap. IX
and McDouAL & FELICIANO, supra note 131 at 232-41.
136. Both groups point to the Caroline definition of self-defense which requires an "in-
stant and overwhelming" necessity "leaving no choice of means and no moment for
deliberation."
137. Rohlik, Remarks on Self-Defense and Intervention: A Reaction to Pending Law
and Civil War in the Modern World 6 GA. I. INT'L & COMp. L. 395, 419 (1977).
138. Id. at 420.
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ciently effected international efforts to avert the war."' 9 Finally,
many theorists believe that an "anticipated attack" is too subjec-
tive and manipulable as a standard to provide an exception from
the prohibition on the use of force. 4 '
As noted above, although it is a question of fact, the immi-
nence, and even the existence of a genuine threat is improbable if
not unlikely. Further, the fact that Grenada probably doesn't have
much of a capacity, if any, for nuclear warfare restricts any realist-
type reliance on potential threats of obliteration as a justification
for striking first, albeit allegedly in self-defense. Indeed, it has not
even been alleged that Grenada had either the means to "obliter-
ate" its neighbors or that it had definitely determined to attack
them with conventional, non-nuclear, weapons. Therefore, even if
the realist's broad and flexible interpretation of article 51 is ac-
cepted, the invasion would not be justified as an act of anticipatory
self-defense under the U.N. Charter.
5. STRUCTURAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL LIMITS ON THE USE OF FORCE
UNDER THE U.N. CHARTER
a. The Security Council
Pursuant to article 24 of the U.N. Charter, the Security Coun-
cil has "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international
peace and security.' ' 41 Article 34 confers jurisdiction upon the
U.N. Security Council to "investigate any dispute, or any situation
which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dis-
pute. .... ,"4' Although the power to investigate is explicitly
granted, the Security Council usually relies on various committees
and commissions for "elucidation" of facts in issue."3 Article 36
provides the Security Council with the power to "recommend ap-
139. Rohlik points to the history of prior antagonistic Egyptian acts including the
blockade of the Gulf of Aquaba and the closing of the Suez Canal and then notes the imme-
diacy of the danger due to the withdrawal of the U.N. Emergency forces, the movement of
massive amounts of Egyptian forces and equipment towards the Israeli border, the current
anti-Israeli hysteria in Egypt at that time and the inability to rely on protection from the
U.N. due to the probable Soviet veto of any potential Security Council action and U Thant's
position as illustrated by his insistence on withdrawing the emergency forces. Id. at 421.
140. Henkin, The Reports of the Death of Article 2(4) are Greatly Exaggerated, 65
AM. J. INT'L L. 544, 545 (1971). See also 2 L. Oppenheim's International Law 156, n. 2 (7th
ed. 1952).
141. U.N. CHARTER, art. 24
142. U.N. CHARTER, art. 34.
143. GOODRICH, HAMBRO & SIMONS, supra note 117at 267.
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propriate procedures or methods of adjustment."' ' Article 37 re-
quires member states to submit disputes which might endanger the
maintenance of international peace and security, and which they
have failed to settle among themselves by the peaceful means
listed in article 33,148 to settlement by the Security Council.
Article 39 authorizes the Security Council to "determine the
existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression.' 46 Therefore, whenever any situation develops which
might be considered deleterious to the maintenance of interna-
tional peace and security, the Security Council has the power to
determine whether such a situation in fact exists. The Security
Council takes the position that member states, or regional organi-
zations composed of member states, can not determine that there
is a threat to the peace without deferring to the Security Council's
exclusive authority to make such a determination.
Article 41 empowers the Security Council to "decide what
measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed
to give effect to its decisions" and thus maintain international
peace and security.17 Article 42 allows the Security Council to
"take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to
maintain or restore international peace and security.""148 Therefore,
as the Security Council allegedly has both the authority and the
ability to deal with any potential challenges to international peace
and security, member states are expected to rely on the Security
Council to deal with any problems, circumstances or situations
which might require the threat or use of force.
The Grenada invasion manifests a blatant disregard of many
of these charter obligations. No situation or dispute was referred to
the Security Council for investigation or settlement, action was
taken prior to any Security Council determination that there was
even a threat to the maintenance of international peace and secur-
ity and the action was taken by a group other than the Security
Council. Critics contend that the Charter mechanisms are inade-
quate, inefficient and impractical due to the veto power of the per-
144. U.N. CHARTER, art. 36.
145. Article 33 lists the procedures recommended for the pacific settlement of disputes
and mentions "negotiations, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settle-
ment, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own
choice." U.N. CHARTER, art. 33.
146. U.N. CHARTER, art. 39.
147. U.N. CHARTER, art. 41.
148. U.N. CHARTER, art. 42.
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manent members of the Security Council who are more than likely
to have a stake in any dispute apt to require U.N. action. Even if
such contentions are accepted, does this justify the failure to main-
tain even a facade of attempted compliance with Charter
obligations?
An argument may be made that the ineffectiveness of the Se-
curity Council is due to a "fundamental change in circumstances"
(i.e. the permanent members' shift from allegiance to opponents)
and therefore, under article 62 of the Vienna Convention, treaty
obligations can be ignored. 14  The Vienna Convention provides
only for the use of this provision in the termination or suspension
of a treaty, however, not for a unilateral avoidance or reinterpreta-
tion of its terms.150 Further, even if the treaty mechanisms are de
facto obsolete and have been completely ignored and avoided in
the state practice of the signatories, the legal obligation to rely on
those mechanisms continues until the treaty has been formally
abandoned by mutual consent. 51 Finally, even though state prac-
tice subsequent to the Charter's signing exhibits a certain amount
of disregard for the prohibition on unilateral uses of force, it is not
enough to show either a de facto amendment of the charter or the
development of a new legal norm in its place. As the American Bar
Association Committee on Grenada noted, "such state practice as
might be offered in evidence of a new legal norm cannot be said to
possess anything like the uniformity, frequency and acknowledge-
ment that is motivated by opinio juris communis.'' 5 2
b. Regional Organizations
Chapter VII, which regulates regional arrangements, was in-
cluded at the insistence of a majority of Latin American Nations.
149. Professor Franck notes that the great power unanimity required for Security
Council action has been almost non-existent as only one collective enforcement action (in
North Korea) has occurred in the Charter's history. Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4) or:
Changing Norms Governing the Use of Force by States, AM. J. INT'L L. 809, 810 (1970).
Further, the ability to take such action was probably only due to the U.S.S.R.'s failure to
attend the meeting when the resolution to act was passed. Id.
150. Vienna Convention, art. 62. This provision limited the doctrine of rebus sic stan-
tibus which allowed a change in circumstance to alter obligations under an agreement and
thus provided states with an excuse for ignoring or avoiding such obligations. 1966 II Yb
INT'L L. COMM'N. at 40.
151. Vienna Convention, art. 62. See generally, the joint dissenting opinion of judges
Onyeama, Billard, Arechaga and Waldock in the 1974 Nuclear Tests (Australia/France)
case I.C.J. Rzp. 253 (1974).
152. A.B.A. REPORT, supra note 15 at 24.
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During the Conference on Problems of War and Peace in Mexico
City, which culminated in the signing of the Act of Chapultepec on
March 3, 1945, representatives of those states
expressed their misgivings about the universalist bias of the
Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, affirmed the value of the Inter-
American system, proclaimed the intent to refurbish and
strengthen that system, and insisted that the constitution of the
new world organization should leave the way open for the func-
tioning of a politically active and largely autonomous Inter-
American agency.163
Therefore, since the UN Charter is based on an implicit compro-
mise between universal and regional international systems, and the
predominant interests and attitudes of each organization tend to
differ, the system which is either applied or circumvented easier
will be relied upon by its members.
The Charter system is based on two potentially conflicting be-
liefs. The system is premised upon the coexistence of the two sys-
tems on the one hand, and the primacy of the global organization,
and the obligations inherent in membership, on the other. Article
52 recognizes that member states have the right to establish "re-
gional arrangements or agencies for dealing with. . . matters relat-
ing to the maintenance of international peace and security."1 " The
provision sets out two explicit limitations on such regional organi-
zations in that the matters they deal with must be "appropriate for
regional action" and their activities must be "consistent with the
Purposes and Principles of the United Nations." ' 55
Disputes between parties to regional arrangements are gener-
ally considered to be suitable for regional action as long as they
can be settled by peaceful means. However, situations which re-
quire preventative or enforcement action, or which involve states
which are not parties to such arrangements, are generally consid-
ered to be beyond the scope of regional action.15 The requirement
that regional organizations must be "consistent with the purposes
and principles of the U.N." simply reflects the principle espoused
in article 103 that UN. Charter obligations prevail over obligations
153. Claude, Jr., The O.A.S., the U.N. and the United States, International Concilia-
tion, No., 547 (March, 1964) p. 5.
154. U.N. CHARTER, art. 52.
155. Id.
156. See KELSEN, aupra note 119 at pp. 918-20 and BOWETr, supra note 81 at pp. 222-
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under other international agreements.1l 7 The clause also illustrates
the drafters' belief that the UN, as a global organization for peace
and security, is the dominant institution and that regional organi-
zations, as subordinate entities, must function within the same
framework and subject to the same purposes and principles.
Paragraphs 2 and 3 of article 52 create an obligation to "make
every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through
. . . regional agencies before referring them to the Security Coun-
cil. ''16s This provision is based on the belief that regional agencies,
because they are closer to the specific situation or dispute, are in a
better position to evaluate the facts and take decisive action faster
and more effectively. Members of regional organizations can bring
their disputes before the Security Council if prompt or peaceful
solutions do not seem to be forthcoming. Further, the ability of the
Security Council to investigate (under article 34) or to hear any
dispute presented by any state, regardless of membership in the
United Nations, (under article 35) has been retained by the Secur-
ity Council under article 52 paragraph 41"5
Article 53 establishes the Security Council's ability to "where
appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements . . . for enforce-
ment action under its authority."1' 0 The text continues in prohibit-
ing enforcement actions by regional agencies except where they are
either (1) authorized by the Security Council; (2) against an "en-
emy state";"' or (3) aim[ed] at preventing such a state from re-
newing its aggressive policies. The immediate issue which arises
under article 53 is to determine what constitutes an "enforcement
action." Kelsen, a restrictionist, found that "enforcement action"
means "action decided on or approved by the Security Council for
the restoration of peace."'"" He therefore concluded that:
[t]he use of force in the exercise of the right of self-defense
under [a]rticle 51 takes place prior to an 'enforcement action' in
the specific sense of the term, that is to say, an action involving
157. Article 103 of the U.N. Charter provides:
[i]n the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United
Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other inter-
national agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.
158. U.N. CHARTER, art. 52 para. 2 and art. 52 pars. 3.
159. U.N. CHARTER, art. 52 para. 4.
160. U.N. CHARTER, art. 53 pars. 1.
161. This term is defined in art. 53 pars. 2 to mean "any state which during the second
World War has been an enemy of any signatory of this Charter."
162. KELSEN, supra note 119 at 921.
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the use of armed or non-armed force taken by the Security
Council. 163
In considering the collective economic measures taken by OAS
members against the Dominican Republic in 1960, the Security
Council found that the measures could have been taken by those
nations individually and that the term "enforcement action" of it-
self suggests a use of force which would require Security Council
authorization. 64 Further, when Cuba requested the Security Coun-
cil to determine whether the OAS Punta Del Este resolutions re-
moving Cuba from the OAS constituted an "enforcement action",
the Security Council declined to do so, noting that it had previ-
ously determined that economic measures did not constitute "en-
forcement action" and that exclusion from a regional organization
also failed to rise to such a level of severity. 65 The Security Coun-
cil also found that the establishment of an Inter-American force by
the OAS in the Dominican Republic in 1965 did not constitute an
"enforcement action" because it was involved as part of a concilia-
tory mission, had no intention to support any claim against the
state and was attempting to achieve a peaceful settlement, under
article 52, not to take "enforcement action", under article 53.1 '
Further, article 54 requires that the Security Council be kept in-
formed of activities "undertaken or in contemplation" by regional
agencies to maintain international peace and security.
67
In light of the failure to even notify the Security Council of
the proposed invasion, it is impossible to contend that the action
was in any way "authorized" by the UN. Further, the failure to
attempt to resolve the situation peacefully prior to any use of force
is a glaring violation of the Charter. Finally, any contention that
the act was an "enforcement action" by a regional organization is
moot in light of the Security Council's immediate response in at-
tempting to condemn the action.168
163. Id.
164. U.N. SCOR (894th and 895th Mtgs), U.N. Doc S/P.V. (1960).
165. See discussion in U.N. SCOR (992-998th Mtgs) U.N. Doc. S/P.V. (1962).
166. Statement of representative of Malaysia. U.N. SCOR (1222nd. Mtg), U.N. Doc S/
P.V. (1965).
167. U.N. CHARTER, art. 54.
168. At the emergency meeting of the U.N. Security Council on October 28th, the group
voted 11 to 1 to condemn the action as a "flagrant violation of international law and of the
independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of [Grenada]." See N.Y. Times, Oct. 29,
1983, at 4.
1984]
80 INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
D. Self-Defense Under The Charter of the Organization of
American States and the Rio Treaty
The Organization of American States (OAS) was created to
promote Inter-American unity and autonomy and to consolidate
the hemisphere's power. It was developed within the framework of
regional arrangements as provided for in Chapter VII of the UN
Charter and thus was organized with many of the same underlying
purposes and principles in mind. Chapter II of the OAS Charter,
which sets out the principles "reaffirmed" by American states, reit-
erates many of those promulgated by the UN Charter, including
"respect for the personality, sovereignty and independence of
states" (article 3(b)), condemnation of wars and acts of aggression
(article 3(e)), and the requirement of settling controversies by
peaceful means (article 3(g)).16'
1. THE DOCTRINE OF NON-INTERVENTION: STRINGENT PROHIBITION
ON THE USE OF FORCE
Articles 18 and 20 constitute the broadest formulation of the
doctrine of non-intervention. 170 Their mandates are the result of a
Latin American obsession with proclaiming an absolute doctrine of
non-intervention and binding every nation in the hemisphere, in-
cluding the United States, to adhere. 17  The principle was first
adopted in the Convention of Rights and Duties of States which
was drafted at the Seventh International Conference of American
States at Montevideo, Uruguay in 1933.17" The doctrine was ex-
panded by subsequent conferences and conventions until it ac-
quired the breadth of its current codification. 7
169. O.A.S. Charter, art. 3 para. (b), (e), and (g).
170. Cabranes, Human Rights and Non-Intervention in the Inter-American System,
65 MIcH. L. REV. 1147, 1156. Non-intervention is the doctrine prohibiting intervention in
any way, shape, form or manner. See generally, THOMAS & THOMAS, NONINTERVENTION,
supra note 110.
171. THOMAS AND THOMAS, THE ORGANIZATION OP AMERICAN STATES 158 (1963). The au-
thors found that it "became a cardinal aim of Latin American Diplomacy to formulate a
code of public international law in the form of a multilateral treaty containing a renuncia-
tion of the right of intervention and binding all American States. Id.
172. Article 8 of the convention reads: "No State has the right to intervene in the inter-
nal or external affairs of another." F.V. GARcIA AMADOR, THiE INTER-AMERiCAN SYSTEM 82
(1983). Acceptance of this provision was the first in an Inter-American instrument, however,
it was not unconditional. The United States submitted a lengthy reservation retaining its
rights "as generally recognized and accepted" in international law. Id. at 85.
173. In 1936, at the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace in Bue-
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Article 18 states that:
No state or group of states has the right to intervene, directly or
indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external
affairs of any other state. The foregoing principle prohibits not
only armed force but also any other form of interference or at-
tempted threat against the personality of the State or against its
political, economic and cultural elements.17'
Article 18 is broad, precise and comprehensive. The application of
the principle to both "state[s] or group[s] of states" prohibits both
unilateral and collective acts (of intervention). 170 The prohibition
on intervention encompasses practically every type of act imagina-
ble; direct or indirect, in the internal or external affairs of states,
and by "any other form of interference or attempted threat."17
This provision extended the doctrine to include acts against a
county's political, economic or cultural elements. 177 Further, it
bans this wide variety of acts regardless of rationale or justification
by forbidding intervention "for any reason whatever."'178
Article 20 explicitly creates a blanket prohibition on military
occupation by providing that "the territory of a state is inviolable;
it may not be the object, even temporarily, of military occupation
or of other measures of force taken by another state, directly, or
indirectly, on any grounds whatever. '1 7  By forbidding military oc-
cupations or any other direct or indirect uses of force "even tempo-
rarily," the provision appears to require territorial inviolability.
This extends the concept of "territorial integrity" applied in article
2(4) of the UN Charter to its extreme limits. The inclusion of the
clause "on any grounds whatever" again exhibits a blindness to ra-
nos Aires, the United States accepted the doctrine of non-intervention. THOMAS & THOMAS
THE O.A.S. supra note 1.71 at 159. The Eighth International Conference of American States,
held at Lima, Peru in 1938, adopted the Declaration of the Principle of the Solidarity of
America which provided for actions against any threats to the "peace, security, or territorial
integrity of any American Republic." GARCIA AMADOR supra note 172 at 266 (vol. II). In
1947, the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance was signed in Rio de Janeiro. The
treaty provides the basis for the present scope of the doctrine of Non-Intervention in arti-
cles 18 and 20.
174. O.A.S. CHARTER, art. 18.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. This Charter was the first to extend the definition of intervention to these ex-
tremes. By encompassing political, social and economic protections, the framers made it
clear that complete independance from interference was the new norm in the Americas.
THOMAS & THOMAS, THE O.A.S. supra note 171 at 159.
178. O.A.S. CHARTER, art. 18.
179. O.A.S. CHARTER, art. 20.
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tionale or justification in expressing an absolute prohibition. In
placing articles 18 and 20 within the chapter on the "rights and
duties of states," the drafters clearly intended for these provisions
to form an integral part of the charter. 180
Although these provisions appear to create a broad prohibition
on the use of force or any other type of intervention, OAS practice
has been less strigent. 181 In 1954, a rebel invasion and subsequent
overthrow of the Guatemalan government gained the tacit ap-
proval of the OAS member states.""8 The unilateral invasion of the
Dominican Republic by the U.S. in 1965, has been cited as a viola-
tion of the OAS Charter.181 The Dominican intervention, however,
was "later converted into an OAS action."" 4 The OAS became em-
broiled in the crisis by approving the establishment of an Inter-
American force to join the U.S. forces in the Dominican Repub-
lic. 1 8 5 Hence, this pattern of behavior may indicate that flexibility
in the interpretation of the OAS Charter, although difficult, may
nonetheless be achieved through U.S. influence in the organization.
The invasion of Grenada, however, illustrates the loss of U.S. influ-
180. GARCIA AMADOR supra note 172 at 81.
181. See generally, F.X. DE LIMA, INTERVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (with a refer-
ence to the OAS) (1971).
182. The newly elected Guatemalan government instituted a land reform policy which
was perceived as discriminatory to U.S. property interests in Guatemala. De Lima notes
that "the USA managed to have an Anti-Communist resolution adopted, directed mainly at
Guatemala [at the 10th Inter-American Conference in Caracas 19541." De Lima argues that
the U.S. supplied arms to the rebel force which invaded Guatemala and toppled the existing
regime. The Guatemalan action, however, gained the support of OAS member states despite
De Lima's allegations that the act violated the OAS Charter.
The attitude of the majority of the Latin American States on the Guatema-
lan issue is baffling [sic], as they supported the violation of the most cherished
principle of non-intervention. At times attempts have been made to excuse Latin
American behavior on the grounds, 1) that they could not hold back a deter-
mined USA, 2) that this was [the] only way of obtaining the much needed eco-
nomic aid from the USA. Whatever motivated them to support the USA, it can-
not be denied that they were creating a precedent which could possibly be
utilized against one of them in the future.
DE LIMA, supra note 102 at 124-25.
183. De Lima points out that the unilateral invasion of the Dominican Republic vio-
lated not only articles 18 and 20, but also the duty to consult other OAS members under
article 6 of the Rio Treaty. See Ds LIMA, supra note 181 at 42. See also Nanda, The United
States' Action in the 1965 Dominican Republic Crisis: Impact on World Order-Part 1, 43
DENVER L.J. 439, 467 (1966). For a detailed analysis of the Dominican Crisis, see generally,
McLaren, The Dominican Crisis: An Inter-American Dilemma, 4 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 178
(1968).
184. DE LIMA, supra note 181 at 43.
185. Tenth Meeting of Consultation, Res. of May 6, 1965, OEA/Ser.F/Il.10 Doc. 39,
Rev. 2 (1965).
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ence over the OAS, as the action was overwhelmingly condemned
initially'8 6 and acquiscence in accepting the action was neither
swift nor unanimous. 87
The OAS Charter's prohibitions on intervention and unilateral
uses of force must be analyzed in conjunction with the Inter-Amer-
ican Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance of 1947 (the Rio Treaty)
which structured the Inter-American system of collective de-
fense.188 The treaty's stated central purpose was "to assure peace,
through adequate means, to provide for effective reciprocal assis-
tance to meet armed attack against any American state, and...
to deal with threats of aggression against any of them."'8 The Rio
Treaty justifies collective action both "in the exercise of the inher-
ent right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Arti-
cle 51 ' ' 190 of the UN Charter and also
[I]f the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sover-
eignty or political independence of any American state should
be affected by an aggression which is not an armed attack or by
an extra-continental or intra-continental conflict, or by any
other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of
America."'
Collective action may only be taken, however, pursuant to a deci-
sion by the Organ of Consultation,'92 or, if immediate action is nec-
essary to combat an armed attack, upon the threatened state's
request, while the Organ of Consultation is deliberating.1'
Although the Organ of Consultation's primary objective is to
settle regional disputes by peaceful means, they have the authority
to rely on the "use of armed force. 1 9 4 The Rio Treaty only autho-
186. See Wash. Post, Oct. 27, 1983, supra note 8.
187. The OAS never actually condoned the invasion officially but when the weapons
and military plans were discovered on Grenada their disapproval of the action ameliorated
and some members even stated their approval of it. N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1983 at A6, col. 4.
188. The Rio Treaty, which went into force on December 3, 1948, set out the precise
rules and regulations regarding the use of force in the Americas. It delineated the circum-
stances justifying both unilateral and collective action, the duties and procedures of the
Organ of Consultation, and the interrelationship with the U.N. Security Council.
189. Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, Preamble.
190. Id., art. 3.
191. Id., art. 6.
192. Id. The Organ of Consultation is composed of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of
the Signatories. Id., art.11. The Organ of Consultation only acts upon a vote of two-thirds of
the signatories. Id., art. 17.
193. Id., art. 3, para. 2.
194. Id., art. 8.
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rizes the use of force in two situations: (1) in individual or collec-
tive self defense under article 51 of the UN Charter; and, (2) pur-
suant to a decision by the Organ of Consultation. Since the
Grenada invasion was neither justified under article 51 of the UN
Charter nor granted the prerequisite approval by the Organ of
Consultation,"' it violated both the OAS Charter and the Rio
Treaty.
2. THE UNITED STATES CONTENDED JUSTIFICATION IN THE O.A.S.
The U.S. government contends, however, that the invasion was
justified under articles 22 and 28 of the OAS Charter as an act of
collective self-defense pursuant to one of the "special treaties on
the subject" and therefore it fell outside the prohibition created by
articles 18 and 20.196 Article 22 provides that "measures taken for
the maintenance of peace and security in accordance with existing
treaties" are not violative of the prohibitions contained in articles
18 and 20.197 Article 28 notes that, in response to acts of aggression
which do not formally constitute an armed attack, "the American
states, in furtherance of the principles on continental solidarity or
collective self-defense, shall apply the measures and procedures es-
tablished in the special treaties on the subject."1 8 The contention
is, therefore, that action pursuant to a "special" or "existing"
treaty, like the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States Treaty, is
removed from both OAS jurisdiction and OAS regulation.
This argument is tenuous at best in light of the fact that the
negotiating history refutes any suggestion that the drafters in-
tended to permit parties to the charter to participate in other col-
lective security agreements within the hemisphere. 1" In fact, any
ambiguity due to using terms like "existing" or "special" treaties
was only due to an attempt to incorporate the Rio Treaty while
simultaneously' avoiding the necessity of amending the OAS Char-
195. In fact, at the extraordinary session of the O.A.S. on October 26, 1983, several
Latin American states strongly condemned the invasion while others regretted that there
was a failure to settle the matter peacefully. See generally Transcript of Extraordinary Ses-
sion of Permanent Council of the Organization of American States, October 26, 1983, OEA/
Ser.G., Dec. CP/ACTA 543/83.
196. Id. at 28-29.
197. O.A.S. CHARcr, art. 22.
198. Id., art. 28.
199. See Actas y Documentos, Novena Conferencia Internacional Americana, Bogota,
Colombia, Marzo 30 - Mayo 2 de 1948, Vol. IV, pp. 73-78 and 234-46.
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ter to reflect subsequent amendments to the Rio Treaty. 00 In con-
sidering that the central purpose of the OAS Charter, especially
when read in conjunction with the Rio Treaty, is to create an abso-
lutely autonomous institution to represent, protect and regulate
the region, it is patently ridiculous to suggest that any action in
the hemisphere can be justified under another regional arrange-
ment. Therefore, as U.S. reliance on articles 22 and 28 is not sup-
ported by the drafting history and as the invasion both violated
the prohibitions delineated in articles 18 and 20 and ignored the
procedural mechanisms involving the Organ of Consultation, the
invasion clearly violates the U.S. obligations under the OAS Char-
ter and the Rio Treaty.
E. Self-Defense Under the Organization of Eastern
Caribbean States Treaty
When the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS)
was created in 1979, one of its "major purposes" was to defend the
"sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence" of its member
states.201 To this end, article 8 set out the "Composition and Func-
tions of the Defense and Security Committee."202 Article 8(4) pro-
vides for "collective defense and the preservation of peace and se-
curity against external aggression. '"2 08 Defensive actions must,
however, fit within "the exercise of the inherent right of individual
or collective self defense recognized by article 51" of the UN char-
ter.204 Further, article 8(5) mandates that the decisions and direc-
tives of the Defense and Security Committee must be
unanimous.205
As an act of collective defense, the Grenada invasion failed to
comply with the conditions set out in article 8. The action was not
taken pursuant to a unanimous decision of all seven members of
the OECS as only four members voted to intervene, two abstained
200. Id., at pp. 39-40. In fact, the original draft versions of Articles 22 and 28 specifi-
cally mentioned the Rio Treaty. Id., at Vol. II, pp. 218-19.
201. O.E.C.S. CHARTER, art. 3(b).
202. O.E.C.S. CHARTER, art. 8.
203. O.E.C.S. CHARTER, art. 8(4). However, these rights specifically include "measures
to combat the activities of mercenaries, operating with or without the support of internal or
national elements." Id. This phrasing seemingly presupposes the right to combat subversive
activities within a state either unilaterally or collectively.
204. O.E.C.S. CHARTER, art. 8(4).
205. O.E.C.S. CHARTER, art. 8(5).
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and one (Grenada) was not represented.2 0 6 Further, article 8 only
allows members to take collective security measures in response to
external aggression or "to combat the activities of mercenaries. ' 7
Therefore, unless those terms can be stretched to cover the civil
strife and political instability in Grenada at the time of the inva-
sion, even if those conditions can be attributed to external forces,
collective defense would not be justified under the treaty. Finally,
pursuant to article 4 of the OECS Treaty, the state concerned
must initiate the request for collective security.2 0 8 Although the
U.S. and her allies in the invasion claimed that their actions were
in response to a confidential appeal from the Governor-General of
Grenada, others have contested the validity of that allegation.2 0
Further, there is a factual question as to whether the revolutionary
council failed to achieve de facto control of the island'so that
power would officially vest in the Governor-General.
2 10
There is also a question as to whether the OECS constitutes a
"regional arrangement" under chapter VII of the UN Charter. Al-
though the Charter fails to define the term, article 52(1) seems to
establish only three criteria: whether the group is (1) regional; (2)
concerned with the maintenance of international peace and secur-
ity; and, (3) consistent with the principles and purposes of the
U.N. 211 Professor Franck noted that the definition could not be
more strenuous than "any grouping of states in some defined geo-
graphical context with historic, ethnic or socio-political ties, which
habitually acts in concert through permanent institutions to foster
unity in a wide range of common concerns." '
Therefore, in light of the malleability of those definitions and
the youth of the organization, the OECS can probably be consid-
ered to be a valid "regional arrangement" under the UN Charter.
206. N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1983, at A19.
207. O.E.C.S. CHARTER, art (4).
208. Id., art. 14.
209. Fidel Castro directly controverted the U.S. reliance on such a request in stating
that the Governor-General himself had "declared that he approved of the invasion but that
he had not previously asked anyone to invade Grenada." See Castro's speech in Havana,
November 14, 1983, as published in Gamma, November 20, 1983, p. 3.
210. The U.N. Security Council apparently concluded that the power so shifted. See
Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, at U.N. Doc. 5/16100 (1983).
211. U.N. CHARTER, art. 52(1).
212. Franck, supra note 149 at 832. Professor Franck reached this conclusion after not-
ing that the chapter of the Charter was drafted with the young Inter-American system in
mind and that it has been flexibly interpreted to recognize economic organizations such as
the European Economic Community and COMECON. Id.
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This determination is crucial "[in view of the fact that regional
organizations are accorded such extensive powers in derogation of
article 2(4), and have garnered much greater powers in practice."'' 8
Conversely, this determination may be limiting because any collec-
tive action involving the use of military force must generally be
regarded as an "enforcement action" and therefore requires au-
thorization or initiation by the Security Council of the UN. Since
article 15(2) of the OECS Treaty expressly subordinates obliga-
tions under that instrument to obligations under prior interna-
tional agreements, any OECS action must be consistent with prior
obligations - such as those under the OAS and UN Charter."1 '
Thus, because the invasion clearly violated those obligations for
the reasons enumerated above, any reliance on the OECS Treaty
as a justification for the invasion is correspondingly limited. Be-
cause the Grenada invasion was neither consistent with the re-
quirements for action under articles 4 and 8 of the OECS Treaty
nor with those superior obligations under either the OAS or UN
Charters, it was not even justified under the OECS Treaty - one of
the primary contended justifications.
F. Realpolitik - Underlying Guidelines Delineating the Ac-
tual Limitations on the Use of Force
In a world where international relations are based on nuclear
weapons, detente, national pride and self interest, and thus, ulti-
mately, on superpower dominance of zones of influence, legality
often becomes subordinated to considerations motivated by real-
politik. Even though acts of 'intervention' and unilateral uses of
force are clearly prohibited by the UN and O.A.S. charters, the
superpowers inevitably use such measures when they believe that
the balance of power is threatened. Because the constraints im-
posed by the charters are not peripheral regulations, but, instead
lie at the core of international efforts to minimize unilateral mili-
tary intervention, it becomes clear that the determinations as to
when, whether and how much force is to be used are based mainly
on political, rather than legal, considerations.
213. Id., at 827.
214. Article 15(2) of the O.E.C.S. Treaty provides that. "the rights and obligations aris-
ing from agreements concluded before the entry into force of this treaty between Member
States and other countries or organizations shall not be affected by the provisions of this
treaty."
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The superpowers probably manifest such a strong desire to
maintain their zones of influence due to their belief in the underly-
ing premise that international peace and stability is inexorably
linked to the stability of the present balance of power.215 DeLima
noted the expansion of this rationale in the era after the Cuban
missile crisis had propelled the world to the edge of a nuclear prec-
ipice in stating that "since the Cuban affair the two superpowers
have taken more than the ordinary precautions and hastened to
intervene, even at the cost of [the] international law on the subject
of the non-use of force, on the very suspicion of an intervention by
an alien power." I16 In fact, both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. have
gone to extreme lengths to tailor international law to include polit-
ical justifications for their actions such as the Johnson 17 and
Brezhnev16 doctrines. These concepts and the corresponding ex-
pansive applications of regional and treaty alliances, such as the
OAS, OECS and Warsaw Pact, illustrate the dominance of political
necessity in a world where legal mechanisms are both allegedly ex-
clusive and almost absolutely inoperative.
As long as twenty years ago, this legal impasse was recognized
when one scholar stated
[t]he charter of the United Nations is a treaty, binding as such
215. De Lima, supra note 181 at 51.
216. Id.
217. The so called "Johnson Doctrine" is really just a corollary to the Monroe Doctrine
which President Johnson promulgated in an announcement on May 3, 1965 in an attempt to
justify the U.S. involvement in the civil strife in the Dominican Republic. President John-
son stated that
the Revolutionary movement took a tragic turn, Communist leaders, many of
them trained in Cuba, seeing a chance to increase disorder, to gain a foothold,
joined the revolution. They took increasing control. And what began as a popu-
lar democratic revolution, committed to democracy, and social justice every
shortly was moved and was taken and really seized and placed into the hands of
a band of communist conspirators . . . [T]he American Nations cannot, and
must not, and will not permit the establishment of another communist govern-
ment in the Western Hemisphere. 17 AimacAs, 43, 1965.
218. The Brezhnev Doctrine was essentially a series of arguments attempting to justify
the Russian military action in Czecholsovakia in 1968. Professor Rohlik reduced the doc-
trine to three principles
1. [A] dispute within the socialist "family" or "commonwealth" of Eastern Eu-
rope must be resolved within that grouping and not by or in the United Nations.
2. [A] member of the family of socialist states must limit its sovereignty to
conform to the requirements of the grouping.
3. [T]he family of socialist states may use force, even military force, by way of
collective self-defense against any attempt to divert a member of the Socialist
Commonwealth from orthodox conformity.
Rohlik, supra note 137 at 832.
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upon the United States. But what if the treaty has been consist-
ently and at times flagrantly violated by the Soviet Union, and
the veto of the Soviet Union has been used to defeat decisions of
the security council? How much of collective security is left in
the situation of 'co-existence' in which we have lived with the
Soviet Union for the past fifteen years? Must the United States
continue to respect obligations and follow procedures when the
other party to the contract violates them.s"
As noted, the legal justifications asserted by the U.S. for aban-
doning its obligations under either the UN or OAS Charters have
neither been met nor, for the most part, alleged and, actions in
derogation of those obligations have not occurred with the fre-
quency, acknowledgement or uniformity to rise to the level of
opinio juris communis and thereby create a new norm. State prac-
tice, however, proceeds as either pursuant to such a behavior-based
norm or in violation of the existing ones. Where the system is inef-
fective or clashes with political policy decisions, it will be ignored,
avoided or circumvented in any expedient manner, regardless of
"legality." Although the degree of violation varies from flagrantly
ignoring obligations to simply stretching attempted compliance,
the motivations are the same and the results are equally blatant.
Therefore, whether one condemns the U.S. actions in the Do-
minican Republic in 1965 and in Grenada today or denounces the
Soviet Union's intrusions into Czechoslovakia in 1968 and into Af-
ghanistan more recently, the underlying motivations are identical
and, although the levels of violation may vary, international law is
subordinated to political reality. The superpowers will continue to
base their action on political exigencies, even if in direct contra-
vention of international law, until the system is more compatible
with political realities. Thus, although the U.S. action in Grenada
can be condemned on a legal basis, it reflects the relative unimpor-
tance of such considerations when the balance of power is even
slightly threatened. Nations will act first, based on national inter-
ests and foreign policies, and leave the legal arguments and justifi-
cations for scholars and outdated institutions in the aftermath.
219. Fenwick, The Quarantine Against Cuba: Legal or Illegal?, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 588,
591 (1963).
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V. INTERVENTION FOR HUMANITARIAN PURPOSES
A. Introduction
It has been noted that intervention by States is a time-
honored practice which is firmly established in the history of inter-
national relations.2 20 Intervention, however, has also been charac-
terized as illegal and inconsistent with traditional notions of sover-
eignty.221 Nevertheless, scholars of international law have long
recognized the right of a state to protect its nationals in another
state through intervention by force .222 The status and scope of this
right of intervention to protect endangered nationals is presently
the topic of debate among modern publicists. Those theorists who
advocate a broad scope for this right of intervention are more re-
flective of the nineteenth century view and are often classified as
representing the imperialist position.23 Increasingly, modern ju-
220. H.F. Morgenthau, To Intervene or Not to Intervene, 45 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 425, 425
(1967). Indeed, Morgenthau states that: "From the time of the ancient Greeks to this day,
some states have found it advantageous to intervene in the affairs of other states on behalf
of their own interests and against the latters' will." Id. See also R. LrrrILE, INTERVENTION,
EXTERNAL INVOLVEMENT IN Civ. WARS, 3 (1975).
221. Vattel maintains that intervention cannot be reconciled with the concept of
sovereignty.
It clearly follows from the liberty and independence of Nations that each
has the right to govern itself as it thinks proper, and that no one of them has the
least right to interfere in the government of another. Of all the rights possessed
by a Nation that of sovereignty is doubtless the most important, and the one
which others should most carefully respect if they are desirous not to give cause
for offense.
VATTE, supra note 83, at 131. For a full overview of the ideas of several publicists regarding
notions of sovereignty juxtaposed with those of intervention see F.X. DE LIMA, supra note
181, at 6-16.
222. Whoever ill-treats a citizen indirectly injures the State, which must protect
that citizen. The sovereign of the injured citizen must avenge the deed and, if
possible, force the aggressor to give full satisfaction or punish him, since other-
wise the citizen will not obtain the chief end of civil society, which is
protection.
VArEL, supra note 83, Bk. II, ch. VI, § 71 at 137. See also E. STOWELL, INTERVENTION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 2-3 (1921); 1 C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 202, at 647 (2d rev.ed.
1947); 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, § 135 at 309 (8th ed. H. Lauterpacht 1955); A.
THOMAS & A. THOMAS, supra note 110, at 305-06. This right of intervention has been articu-
lated perhaps most forcefully by Bowett. "The right of the State to intervene by the use or
threat of force for the protection of its nationals suffering injuries within the territory of
another state is generally admitted, both in the writing of jurists and in the practice of
states." D.W. Bowwrr, supra note 81, at 97.
223. Oppenheim illustrates this view by proposing such a right of intervention even for
the protection of a national's honor. "The right of protection over citizens abroad, which a
State holds, may cause an intervention by right to which the other party is legally bound to
COMMENTS
rists have maintained that this right of intervention is limited in
scope and application.2 2' Although the French Revolution has been
cited as the root of the limitation upon the right to intervene,
22 5
the adoption of the United Nations Charter in 1945 has fueled the
argument of those advocating restriction of this right.2"
In the context of the Grenada invasion, several theories have
been advanced to either condone or condemn the U.S. interven-
tion. Numerous theorists and several governments have criticized
the invasion of Grenada as an unjustified intervention.2 7 The
United States, at least initially, maintained that the action was
taken to protect the safety of U.S. nationals on Grenada during a
period of anarchy on the island.22 8 The initial arguments put forth
by the supporters of these conflicting viewpoints illustrate the ten-
sion between the basic documents of both the UN and the OAS
and the concept of realpolitik in today's world of superpower
rivalry.
B. The Legal Framework
1. THE U.N. CHARTER
Although the doctrine of forceful intervention to protect
threatened nationals is a right that has been recognized in interna-
tional law,229 modern theorists argue that the adoption of article
2(4) of UN Charter precludes such forceful measures of self-
help.23sArticle 2(4) prohibits the threat or use of force with an ex-
ception reserved by article 51 which permits the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense. These articles have fomented
considerable debate regarding their interpretation. Conflicting
schools of thought have evolved concerning the legality of forcible
submit. And it matters not whether protection of the life, security, honour, or property of a
citizen abroad is concerned." OPPENHEIM, supra note 222, § 135 at 309.
224. Several modern theorists have been categorized as representing the restrictionist
theory of intervention. Among those in this category are Brierly, Brownlie, De Lima and
Jessup. For a discussion of the restrictive theory and its proponents see Note, Resort to
Force by States to Protect Nationals: The U.S. Rescue Mission to Iran and its Legality
Under the International Law, 21 VA. J. INT'L L. 485, 487-91 (1981).
225. Morgenthau, supra note 220 at 425.
226. Note, supra note 224 at 487-88.
227. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
228. Statement of Jeanne J. Kirkpatrick, supra note 9, at 37-38. See also Transcript of
Address by President on Lebanon and Grenada, supra note 7 at col. 5.
229. See supra note 222.
230. See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
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intervention to protect nationals under the UN Charter.231
Those publicists who insist upon a rigid interpretation of arti-
cles 2(4) and 51 have been classified as supporters of the restric-
tionist theory. The restrictionists argue that the right of interven-
tion to protect nationals is inconsistent with the UN Charter and
modern principles of international law, and is thus, obsolete. Jes-
sup, a leading restrictionist, notes that
[tihe landing of armed forces of one state in another state is a
"breach of the peace" or "threat to the peace" even though
under traditional international law it is a lawful act. It is a mea-
sure of forcible self-help, legalized by international law because
there has been no international organization competent to act in
an emergency. The organizational defect has now been at least
partially remedied through the adoption of the Charter, and a
modernized law of nations should insist that the collective mea-
sures envisaged by article 1 of the Charter shall supplant the
individual measures approved by traditional international law.2 "
Moreover, the restrictionists maintain that this right of forcible in-
tervention is generally employed as an imperialist tool for achiev-
ing Western aims. 233
Consequently, in view of the large number of third-world and
developing states which are the most susceptible to such interven-
tion, a lopsided majority of UN States support this restrictive in-
terpretation of article 2(4).'" There are, however, a number of le-
gal theorists that dispute this literal interpretation of article 2(4)
and 51. These publicists, along with several Western govern-
ments,8 5 submit that the right to intervene to protect nationals on
foreign territory remains intact within the framework of the UN
231. For a thorough analysis of the views of these schools and their leading proponents
see Note, supra note 224 at 487-501.
232. P. JEssup, supra note 87, at 169-70 (1948). Brownlie considers it "very doubtful
whether this form of intervention [to protect the lives of nationals on foreign territory] has
any basis in the modern law. Only a minority of states have continued to assert its legality
in the more recent period." I. BROWNLIE, supra note 88, at 433.
233. "Restrictionists contend that such a doctrine,. . . merely gave imperialist powers
and legal pretext to intervene in states for political, economic, or religious reasons." Note,
supra note 145 at 488. The term "pretext" has been used frequently by states in describing
such interventions. The reaction of the African states to the U.S.-Belgian intervention in the
Congo in 1964 illustrates this notion. See Note, The Congo Crisis 1964: A Case Study in
Humanitarian Intervention, 12 VA. J. INT'L L. 261, 269 n.44 (1972).
234. See Fonteyne, Forcible Self-Help by States to Protect Human Rights: Recent
Views from the United Nations, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS
197 app. B, fn. 79-81 at 217 (R. Lillich ed. 1973).
235. Id. at 212-13.
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Charter."'8 The scholars that support this liberal interpretation
differ over the theories which buttress the pro-intervention posi-
tion. One commentator has thus divided the pro-interventionists
into two groups, the realist theorists and the self-defense
theorists 8 7
The realists argue that the right to intervene to protect na-
tionals is premised on humanitarian concerns which are in har-
mony with the underlying goals of the UN. 35 The true core of the
realist theory is the notion that the UN's collective security mea-
sures are ineffective in crisis situations where the safety of human
lives are at stake23 9 The self-defense theory bases its stance upon
Vattel's notion of self-defense, that an injury to the citizen is an
injury to the state.24 0 Bowett insists that this traditional concept of
self-defense is incorporated in the right of self-defense contained
in article 51.
Article 51 is declaratory of an existing right, not constitutive of
new rights ... There is nothing in the travauxpreparatoires to
support the view that only in cases of armed attack could the
right of self-defense be exercised. Indeed, such a restriction of
the right of self-defense under general international law could
only be achieved by a specific prohibition; Article 51 is permis-
sive not prohibitive, and,. . . the only prohibitive article, Arti-
cle 2(4), leaves the right of self-defense unimpaired.24 '
Therefore, the self-defense theory maintains that where a foreign
state is unwilling or unable to protect an alien, the right of inter-
vention by the alien's state of nationality is thus, preserved.
2. THE O.A.S. CHARTER
Articles 18 and 20 of the Charter of the Organization of Amer-
ican States (OAS) contain strong language which prohibits inter-
236. These pro-interventionists include Waldock, Bowett, Morgenthau and Lillich. See
C. Waldock, supra note 87. D.W. Bowr, supra note 81; Morgenthau supra note 220 at
430-36; K Lillich, Forcible Self-Help by States to Protect Human Rights, 53 IOWA L. REv.
325 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Lillich, Forcible Self-Help].
237. See Note, supra note 224 at 491-501,
238. Id. at 494.
239. Lillich, supra note 236 at 335-36. Lillich points out that the UN Security Council
is unable "to act with the speed requisite to preserve life." Id. quoting P. Jzssup, supra note
87 at 170.
240. VATrrL, supra note 83.
241. Bowett, The Use of Force in the Protection of Nationals, 43 TRANS. GROT. Soc'y
111, 116-17 (1957).
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vention or interference of any form and precludes military occupa-
tion of another state for any reason."' Unlike the various
interpretations which suggest flexibility of the provisions of articles
2(4) and 51 of the UN Charter, the wording of articles 18 and 20 of
the OAS Charter provide no such malleability. The rigidity of this
language is perhaps reflective of the troubled history of the region
and the fact that Latin American states were frequently the target
of intervention." ' It has been observed that in the Inter-American
system
[n]o state has a right to intervene in another state in favor of
the life or liberty of its nationals except through intercession of
diplomatic representation in a friendly, conciliatory action with-
out any character of coercion, undertaken only after there has
been previous exhaustion of the possible local remedies and a
clear denial of justice."'
Nevertheless, despite the literal meaning of articles 18 and 20, in-
tervention to protect nationals on foreign territory has occurred,
and paradoxically, has received the consent of the OAS.
C. The Right to Protect U.S. Nationals
In the days following the invasion of Grenada, the United
States asserted its right to protect U.S. nationals in Grenada im-
periled by a lack of governmental authority following the murder
of Prime Minister Bishop. Mrs. Kirkpatrick, the U.S. Ambassador
to the UN articulated this position in her address to the Security
Council on October 27, 1983.
Of course, it goes without saying that the United States does not
advocate that in normal circumstances concern for the safety of
a State's nationals in a foreign country may justify military mea-
sures against that country. But normal circumstances presup-
pose the existence of a Government which, regardless of its dem-
ocratic, non-democratic or anti-democratic nature or the system
which it pursues, is nevertheless recognized as minimally re-
sponsible for not wantonly endangering the lives of its citizens
and foreign nationals and the security of neighboring states in
the region. Where, however, terrorists murder the leading citi-
242. OAS CHAaTz, arts 18 and 20. See supra note 232.
243. Ds LMA, aupra note 181 at 122. See also Nanda, supra note 183 at 446-47. See
also THoMAs & THoMAS, supra note 110 at 327.
244. See supra notes 182-85 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 16:1
COMMENTS
zenry and leadership of their own country, a situation may well
arise in which no Government replaces the former order, but an-
archy prevails. In those circumstances, the general rule of inter-
national law permits military action to protect endangered na-
tionals. [T]his was indeed a unique situation, in which there
existed a vacuum of responsible governmental authority."'
The argument that customary international law permits interven-
tion where there is a lapse of governmental authority has been ob-
served by several theorists. It does, however, turn on a question of
facts. Was such a vacuum of authority evident in Grenada preceed-
ing the invasion?
The lack of effective governmental authority has, indeed, been
recognized as a situation where intervention to protect nationals
would be justified. Borchard maintained that "[iln the absence of
any central authority over states having power to enforce the prin-
ciples of international law, the right of diplomatic protection was
self-help for its sanctions."246 Although, such a right has been rec-
ognized, it is, nonetheless, not without limitations.
Waldock considered this right of intervention in the post-UN
Charter era.
I
[T]he general principle of self-protection remains untouched by
the [UN] Charter. But, clearly, only cases of extreme urgency to
prevent irreparable injury could justify the introduction of
troops into foreign territory."'7
Waldock, then analyzes this notion in terms of the Abadan Oil in-
cident. 248 Observing that it would be rather difficult to justify the
landing of troops to prevent the nationalization of British property
by Iran, Waldock distinguishes a hypothetical situation where
British lives would be imperiled.
[Ihf law and order had completely broken down, and the com-
munity of British nationals in Abadan had been faced with al-
most certain death or serious injury, then loss of life being irrep-
arable, it is considered that the long established right of
protection would have justified intervention for the sole purpose
245. Statement of Jeanne J. Kirkpatrick, supra, note 9 at 37-38.
246. E. BORCHARD, THE DIPLOMATIC PROTrcCTON Or CITzZNs ABROAD 346-47 (1915).
247. Waldock, supra note 87 at 503.
248. For an explanation of the Abadan or Anglo-Iranian Oil Company incident, see
BstowNum, supra note 88 at 296-97; W. Bishop, Jr., The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Case,
45 AM. J. INTL L. 749 (1951).
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of securing the safe removal of nationals. 4
Nevertheless, Waldock insists that "[e]ven then the permission of
the local government ought if possible to have been sought."5 0
Waldock establishes several criteria, which if satisfied, would
justify forcible intervention. "There must be (1) an imminent
threat of injury to nationals, (2) a failure or inability on the part of
the territorial sovereign to protect them and (3) measures of pro-
tection strictly confined to the object of protecting against in-
jury."2 5 1 Waldock thus indicates by the use of the word "and" in
joining these three conditions, that all three of these factors must
be present for such a measure to qualify as a justifiable instance of
self-protection. Bowett, a proponent of the self-defense theory of
intervention,25 2 has identified three similar conditions as the "nor-
mal requirements of self-defense."253
These three conditions have been applied to analyze previous
interventions. Friedmann observes that the Waldock statement
was invoked by the British Government to buttress its 1956 inva-
sion of the Suez Canal region in Egypt.2" Friedmann, however,
notes that during the Suez crisis "there was no breakdown of or-
ganized government in Egypt nor any physical threat to foreign
nationals . . ."255 On this basis, Friedman distinguishes the Suez
intervention from the U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic
in 1965, which he argues "had much greater legal justification. "258
249. Waldock, supra note 87 at 509 (emphasis added).
250. Id.
251. Id. at 467.
252. Note, supra note 224 at 498-501.
253. "Intervention for the protection of the intervening states' own nationals tradition-
ally has been and still is today a part of the customary right of self-defense, Its exercise
must be subject to the normal requirements of self-defense, that is to say, there must exist a
failure in the territorial state to accord the protection for aliens demanded by international
law, there must be an actual or imminent danger requiring urgent action, and the action
taken must be proportionate and limited to the necessities of extricating the nationals from
the danger." Bowett, The Interrelation of Theories of Intervention and Self-Defense in
LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 38, 44 (J. Moore ed. 1974). (hereinafter cited as
Intervention and Self-Defense].
254. W. Friedmann, United States Policy and the Crisis of International Law, 59 AM.
J. INT'L L. 857, n.10 at 867 (1965).
An account of the British intervention in the Suez Canal crisis may be found in Q.
Wright, Intervention 1956, 51 AM. J. INT'L L. 257 (1957); See also BROwNL E, supra note 88
at 297.
255. Friedmann, supra note 254, n.10 at 867.
256. "[T]he United States had much greater legal justification for its original, limited
intervention in protection of its nationals in the Dominican crisis than did Great Britain in
the Suez crisis." Id.
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The U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic bears strik-
ing resemblance to the invasion in Grenada.267 As a justification for
the Dominican intervention, the U.S. cited "a complete breakdown
of law and order," and that the Dominican authorities "could no
longer provide any assurance for the safety of American lives."' 68
Nevertheless, the Dominican intervention fails to satisfy the third
condition of either the Waldock or Bowett theory of justified inter-
vention, because U.S. forces remained on the island well after U.S.
nationals were evacuated."' Since the bulk of the U.S. force re-
mained intact for at least two months after the departure of the
last endangered national, this same defect plagues the legal justifi-
cation of the Grenada action as well.
The realist theorists assert that intervention to protect the
lives of endangered nationals are legal under the UN Charter. This
theory is premised on the fact that the intervening state
seeks neither a territorial change nor a challenge to the political
independence of the State involved and is not only not inconsis-
tent with the purposes of the United Nations but is rather in
conformity with the most fundamental norms of the Charter, it
is a distortion to argue that it is precluded by Article 2(4).""
Perhaps the realist notion of a legal intervention is more accu-
rately described as a rescue mission.2 61 Such missions are normally
composed of a small strike force which aims only to secure the
evacuation of the endangered individuals. Thus, illustrations of in-
terventions which are consistent with the realist theory are the
Mayaguez incident in Cambodia,26 2 the Israeli raid in Entebbe, 63
257. See supra notes 182-85 and accompanying text.
258. Meeker, The Dominican Situation in the Perspective of International Law, 53
DEP'T. STATE BULL. 60, 61 (1965). Compare Statement by Jeanne J. Kirkpatrick, supra note
9 at 37-38.
259. See Nanda, supra note 183 at 440.
Lillich questioned the legality of the Dominican intervention in view of the lengthy
deployment of U.S. troops on the island following the departure of U.S. nationals. The
LC.J. Decisions and Other Public International Law Issues, in THE IRAN CmsIs AND INTER-
NATIONAL LAW (R. Steele ed. 1981) (remarks of R. Lillich) at 31 [hereinafter cited as The
Iran Crisis]. See also Bowett, Intervention and Self-Defense, supra note 253, at 45 n.19.
260. Riesman & McDougal, Humanitarian Intervention to Protect the Ibos, in HuMAN-
ITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THS UNITED NATIONS 167, 177 (R. Lillich ed. 1973).
261. See generally Comment, Controlling International Terrorism: An Analysis of
Unilateral Force and Proposals for Multilateral Cooperation, U. ToL. L. REv. 209, 219-23
(1976).
262. See generally Finch, Pueblo and Mayaguez: A Legal Analysis, 9 CASE W. RES. J.
INT'L L. 79 (1977); Paust, The Seizure and Recovery of the Mayaguez, 85 YALE L.J. 774
(1976).
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and the aborted attempt to rescue U.S. hostages in Iran.2 " Com-
mentators have suggested that the recent International Court of
Justice opinion in U.S. Staff in Tehran may be read as condoning
the rescue-mission-type operation.se Lillich argues that the major-
ity's silence regarding the legality of the rescue mission is signifi-
cant and suggests at best, tacit approval of such tactics or at least,
reluctance to condemn such action. 2" Nevertheless, Lillich lists
several criteria which must be satisfied to justify an act of inter-
vention to protect endangered nationals.
First, there obviously has to be a very serious and immedi-
ate threat or violation to someone's human rights. Second, there
has to be a very widespread violation of human rights. Third,
the degree of coercive measures that are employed has to be rea-
sonable and proportionate. . . And, lastly, the State that's us-
ing forcible self-help has to be relatively disinterested.2 67
Bowett interprets the I.C.J. decision in the Corfu Channel
Case,""s between Great Britain and Albania, as a rejection of the
realist theory.269 In the Corfu Channel Case, Britain alleged that
neither Albania's territorial integrity nor its political independence
had been disturbed by a temporary minesweep operation which
263. See generally, Note, Use of Force for the Protection of Nationals Abroad: The
Entebbe Incident, 9 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 117, 133 (1977); Knisbacher, The Entebbe
Operation: A Legal Analysis of Israel's Rescue Action 12 J. IN'r'L LAW & EcoN. 57 (1979).
264. See generally, Note, supra note 224.
265. See The Iran Crisis, supra note 259, at 25-32. (remarks of R. Lillich).
266. Id. at 29. Lillich concludes by noting that: [tihe fact that the Court did not
condemn it, [intervention by a state to protect its nationals], and that this
open question that has been debated so much these last ten or fifteen years
still remains open, suggests to me that the case of the proponents of the doc-
trine has been strengthened by the Court's incidental treatment of it.
Id. at 32. Compare the dissenting opinion of Judge Morozov which harshly condemned the
U.S. attempt to rescue the hostages as an illegal act under international law. 1980 I.C.J. 51
(Morozov, J., dissenting).
267. Id. at 31. To illustrate this last point, Lillich states that the U.S. rescue mission to
Iran "would have run afoul of this criteria," had the mission intended to affect any purpose
other than rescuing the hostages. Id.
268. Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Albania), 1949 I.C.J. 4.
The Corfu Channel decision considered the question of Britan's unilateral use of force.
Britain claimed that damage was caused to British vessels and, consequently, loss of life to
British nationals navigating through the Corfu Strait by a minefield of anchored automatic
mines laid by Albania. Britain responded by organizing "Operation Retail" in which mine-
sweepers were sent into Albanian territorial waters. The apparent rationale for this opera-
tion was to gather evidence of the minefield" in order to submit it to an international tribu-
nal .... " 1949 I.C.J. at 34.
269. Bowett, Intervention and Self-Defense, supra note 253 at 45.
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sought merely to gather evidence to prove Britain's claim."" The
court, however, found that the incursion into Albanian waters, re-
gardless of its temporary nature, was nevertheless a violation of
Albanian sovereignty.271 Bowett maintains that the court's rejec-
tion of this temporary incursion renders the theoretical foundation
of the realist notion of intervention unsound because it justifies the
use of force solely on humanitarian, rather than self-defense
grounds.172 "[Florceful intervention based simply on humanitarian
grounds and unrelated to a threat to one's own nationals is illegal
under the United Nations Charter."' 7 1
The self-defense theory of intervention, advanced by Bowett,
justifies intervention under article 51 of the charter, based on the
notion that an injury to a national is an injury to the state. Conse-
quently, such an injury is a breach of the territorial state's duty
"to accord protection for aliens demanded by international law."2 4
Therefore, it is argued that the breach of this legal duty justifies a
temporary violation of territorial sovereignty of the breaching
state.'
7
'
An analysis, under either the realist theory or the self-defense
theory, proves fatal to the initial U.S. justification in both the Do-
minican Republic 79 intervention and that in Grenada as welln.77 In
Grenada, the U.S. maintained that intervention was necessary to
ensure the safety of U.S. nationals on an island plunged into anar-
chy.17 Both the realist theory as articulated by both Waldock and
270. 1949 I.C.J. at 34.
271. 1949 I.C.J. at 35.
272. Bowett, Intervention and Self-Defense, supra note 253 at 44.
273. Id. at 45.
274. Id. at 44.
275. Id.
276. Meeker, supra note 258 at 64. Bowett criticizes the invasion of the Dominican
Republic because "though this was a case of protection of nationals, the U.S. later did shift
the ground for its jurisdiction for the presence of its forces to one of maintaining peace and
security in the area at the request of the authorities of Santo Domingo." Bowett, Interven-
tion and Self-Defense supra note 253, at 45 n.19.
277. Statement by Jeanne J. Kirkpatrick, supra note 9 at 38.
278. Id. At a press conference conducted on the day of the Grenada invasion, President
Reagan explained the reasons for invading Grenada.
We have taken this decisive action for three reasons.
First, and of overriding importance, to protect innocent lives, including up
to 1,000 Americans, whose personal safety is, of course, my paramount concern.
Second, to forestall further chaos.
And third, to assist in the restoration of conditions of law and order and of
governmental institutions to the island of Grenada, where a brutal group of left-
ist thugs violently seized power, killing the prime minister, three cabinet mem-
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Lillich, 279 and the self-defense theory put forth by Bowett50 are
contingent upon the existence of an immenent threat of injury to
the nationals of the intervening state. Although the U.S. has con-
sistently maintained that such a threat existed, the validity of this
premise has been questioned.'"' It is, however, quite likely that the
true extent of the actual danger existing prior to the invasion may
never be known.
The justification of the United States intervention in Grenada,
contains a serious flaw which renders it inconsistent with either the
realist or self-defense theory. Waldock, 82 Lillich 2 3 and Bowett s"
have stated that a legal intervention must be proportionate to the
magnitude of the crisis and must be limited to the exigencies of
evacuating threatened nationals. Admittedly, the U.S. maintained
that the purpose of the intervention was not only to protect the
safety of U.S. nationals, but also to remedy the alleged vacuum of
effective authority in Grenada.2 8a Bowett argues that non-compli-
ance with the three conditions for a justified intervention will
bers, two labor leaders and other civilians including children.
Let there be no misunderstanding, this collective action has been forced on
us by events that have no precedent in the eastern Caribbean and no place in
any civilized society.
American lives are at stake.
We've been following the situation as closely as possible.
Between 800 and 1,000 Americans, including many medical students and
senior citizens, make up the largest single group of foreign residents in Grenada.
Wash. Post, Oct. 26, 1983, at 7 cola. 1-5. See also Transcripts of Shultz News Conference on
Invasion of Grenada, N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1983, at A18, cols. 1-6.
279. Waldock, supra note 87 and accompanying text. See also Lillich supra note 236
and accompanying text.
280. Bowett, Intervention and Self-Defense, supra note 253.
281. McQuiston, supra note 2. Compare statements of other U.N. Ambassadors with
that of Jeanne J. Kirkpatrick, supra note 9. (Guyana) "My delegation understands that all
foreigners on the island were safe and that at no time was their welfare in question." U.N.
SCOR (2487th mtg.) at 36-37, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2487. (Grenada) (Grenadian authorities as-
sured the U.S. government that U.S. nationals were fully protected and free to leave). U.N.
SCOR (2487th mtg.) at 42-44, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2487. (Cuba) "[T]he United States consul to
Saint George's stated that the United States citizens there, including the medical students,
were perfectly well ...anyone who wanted to leave the country would be able to do so
without any problem as soon as international flights were resumed. U.N. SCOR (2487th
mtg.) at 57, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2487. (France) "The justifications put forward relating to the
internal situation of Grenada, do not seem to us to be admissible." U.N. SCOR (2487th
mtg.) at 75, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2489.
282. Waldock, supra note 236 and accompanying text.
283. Lillich supra note 236 and accompanying text.
284. Bowett, Intervention and Self-Defense, supra note 253.
285. See generally, Statement of Jeanne J. Kirkpatrick supra note 9; Wash. Post,
supra note 278; Transcript of Shultz News Conference, supra note 278.
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enlarge the right to protection into a more general right of hu-
manitarian intervention [which] would. . . introduce a danger-
ous exception to these prohibitions. Such intervention will, in
the nature of things, be confined to intervention in small states
who cannot oppose the intervening forces of a large power. It
will be susceptible to use for ulterior motives, as in the past:
that is to say, it will be used as a cover for interference in the
domestic, internal affairs of the state, notably to influence the -
outcome of an internal struggle. It may also encourage counter-
intervention by states, with the consequent risk of an escalation
of conflict.'
The U.S. invasion of the Dominican Republic in 1965, is cited by
Bowett as an incident which may cause the formulation of a "dan-
gerous exception" to the prohibitions on intervention.'
Lillich attempts to close this "dangerous exception" by includ-
ing a fourth condition, to wit, that the intervening State be rela-
tively disinterested. 88 This condition of relative disinterest re-
quires the intervening State to be motivated by "humanitarian,
not political or economic [goals]. ' '289 The U.S. rescue mission to
Iran provides an illustration of an act of self-help motivated by
humanitarian goals. That mission aimed only to rescue the hos-
tages,2 90 not to affect a change of government in Iran, or to seal'a
lacuna in effective leadership.
The invasion of Grenada is thus distinguishable from the real-
ist's notion of a justified intervention. The Grenada operation, like
its predecessor in the Dominican Republic, sought to cure the vac-
uum of effective authority in Grenada. 91 Indeed, U.S. forces re-
mained on the island long after U.S. nationals were evacuated. 2 1
This fact demonstrates that the legal justification of the U.S. inter-
vention in Grenada could not be premised on the right to protect
endangered nationals.
286. Bowett, Intervention and Self-Defense, supra note 253 at 45.
287. Id. at note 19. Professor Lillich also criticizes the Dominican intervention on this
basis. In discussing the criteria of a justified intervention, Lillich comments that the contin-
ued occupation by U.S. troops following evacuation of U.S. nationals was improper. The
Iran Crisis, supra note 259.
288. Lillich supra note 236 and accompanying text.
289. Note, supra note 224 at 512.
290. Id.
291. See generally, Statement of Jeanne J. Kirkpatrick, supra note 9; Wash. Post,
supra note 278; Transcript of Shultz News Conference, supra note 278.
292. N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1983 at A9 cols. 1-6.
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D. The Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention
A State's right of territorial sovereignty has been characterized
as an imperfect right. The salient imperfection, which qualifies the
right of sovereignty is the notion that States will maintain mini-
mum standards of human decency. If, however, those standards
are not maintained, scholars of international law have long recog-
nized the right of humanitarian intervention.29 3 Humanitarian in-
tervention is defined as an intervention by one State in the inter-
nal affairs of another State to ensure that the human rights of the
inhabitants are not flagrantly violated.2 9' Such a right is said to
exist:
[W]here a State under exceptional circumstances disregards cer-
tain rights of its own citizens, over whom presumably it has ab-
solute sovereignty, the other states of the family of nations are
authorized by international law to intervene on the grounds of
humanity. When these 'human' rights are habitually violated,
one or more states may intervene in the name of the society of
nations and may take such measures as to substitute at least
temporarily, if not permanently, its own sovereignty for that of
the state thus controlled.2 9
The doctrine was first employed in the nineteenth century to
justify several such interventions."' Although the doctrine has not
been frequently invoked, one commentator has noted that "the
doctrine appears to have been so clearly established under custom-
ary international law that only its limits and not its existence is
subject to debate."'2 97
During the twentieth century, however, the doctrine began to
wane in popularity. Indeed, "[tjhe concept of humanitarian inter-
vention has the distinct flavor of the nineteenth century which was
relatively a century of tolerance and progress. 2 98 The nineteenth
293. For a history of the right of humanitarian intervention see A. THOMAS & A.
THOMAS, supra note 110 at 372-74 (1956); E. STOWELL, supra note 222, at 51-54.
294. E. STOWELL, supra note 222 at 51-54. See also Note, supra note 233 at 264-65.
295. E. BORCHARD, THE DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD 14 (1915).
296. See A. THOMAS & A. THOMaS, supra note 110 at 373. The Thomases list the di-
verse incidents of humanitarian intervention in the nineteenth century. See also Lillich,
Intervention to Protect Human Rights, 15 McGILL L.J. 205, 209 (1969).
297. Lillich, supra note 296 at 210. At least one publicist, Hall, maintained that no
right of humanitarian intervention was established by customary international law. See
W.E. HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 302-05 (1969).
298. A. THOMAS & A. THOMAS, supra note 110 at 373.
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century, however, was also an era of imperialism, and the state in-
tervening for humanitarian purposes was always one of the great
imperial or pseudo-imperial powers."' Evidence of the fall from
grace of the doctrine may be seen in the lack of intervention in the
face of atrocities committed by Hitler's Germany, Franco's Spain
or Stalin's Russia. 00 Several theorists submit that the doctrine was
invalidated by the signing of the Charter of the United Nations,
particularly, by the prohibition on the use of force established by
article 2(4).81 Furthermore, in the inter-American setting, articles
18 and 20 of the OAS Charter seem to "completely prohibit [hu-
manitarian] intervention." 02 Nevertheless there are publicists who
interpret article 2(4) in a manner which preserves the right of hu-
manitarian intervention. 08
If, however, one assumes that the doctrine of humanitarian in-
tervention remains a valid alternative, could the doctrine be used
299. Great Britain, France, the United States and Russia.
300. A. THOMAS & A. THOMAS, supra note 110 at 373. "For nationals of [a State], the
common assumption is that international law offers no protection, other than the obsolete
doctrines of humanitarian intervention." M. McDouGAL & F. FELICIANO, supra note 131, at
90.
301. "Intervention by the use or threat of force is, apart from self-defense, probably
. . . illegal under the Charter." D. BowErr, SELF-DEFENSE, supra note 81 at 14. Brownlie
notes that "[iut is considered very doubtful whether this form of intervention has any basis
in the modern law. Only a minority of States have continued to assert its legality in the
more recent period." I. BROWNLIE, supra note 88, at 433; P. JEssup, supra note 88, at 169-70.
The Thomases note that "[tihe general international law right of an individual nation
or group of nations to intervene for humanitarian purposes remains unchanged, except that
this intervention may no longer be taken by means involving the use of force." A. THOMAS &
A. THOMAS, supra note 110 at 384.
302. A. THOMAS & A. THOMAS, supra note 110 at 385-90. The Thomases note that:
Although the Charter of the United Nations does not change the general inter-
national law right of individual intervention for humanitarian purposes, except
that such intervention may no longer be intervention by use of or threat of force,
it would seem that the Charter of Bogota does, as far as the American States are
concerned, completely prohibit such intervention.
Id. at 390.
303. See Lillich, Forcible Self-Help supra note 236, at 325; I. L. OPPENHEIM, supra note
222 at 279-80; Professors Reisman and McDougal noted that:
[tihe advent of the United Nations neither terminated nor weakened the cus-
tomary institution of humanitarian intervention. In terms of its substantive mar-
row, the Charter strengthened and extended humanitarian intervention, in that
it confirmed the homocentric character of international law and set in motion a
continuous authoritative process of articulating international human rights, re-
porting and deciding infractions, assessing the degree of aggregate realization of
human rights, and appraising its own work.
REISMAN & McDouoAL, supra note 260, at 171.
For a complete overview of the debates regarding the legality of humanitarian interven-
tion, see Note, supra note 233 at 266-74.
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by the United States to justify its position in the Grenada inva-
sion? Although the United States, in defending its actions in Gre-
nada, never expressly invoked the doctrine of humanitarian inter-
vention, nonetheless, the doctrine is the natural progression of the
stated legal position of the U.S.3oe Indeed, action aimed at curing a
"vacuum of effective authority,"""5 arguably protects the inhabi-
tants of the invaded State from the effects of anarchy and presum-
ably from a lack of governmental protection as well. Such interven-
tion could persist until the lacuna of governmental authority was
cured. Conceivably, this crisis could be alleviated by a temporary
or permanent imposition of the intervening State's sovereignty to
the invaded territory.30 6
In the context of the Grenada invasion, it could be argued that
the United States intervention was motivated by a humanitarian
concern for the Grenadian populace. The troublesome fact of the
United States' continued presence on the island, which presented
an impediment to a legal justification based on the right to protect
endangered nationals, could thus be overcome by the need to en-
sure the existence of an effective governmental unit that could pro-
tect Grenadians. Nevertheless, one crucial factor appears to be
lacking in this humanitarian intervenionist analysis.
The right to resort to humanitarian intervention is condi-
tioned on the existence in the target State of violations of "the
universally recognized principles of decency and humanity. 3 07 The
doctrine addresses "flagrant and persistent violations of the recog-
nized principles of humanity," 08 not an "occasional abuse and in-
stance of inhumane action."309 Lauterpact noted that "interna-
tional recognition manifested itself in the precarious doctrine of
humanitarian intervention in cases in which a State maltreats its
subjects in a manner which shocks the conscience of mankind."310
Prior to the invasion of Grenada, one could point to perhaps
one instance of a flagrant violation of human rights.31 Indeed, it is
304. Statement of Jeanne Kirkpatrick, supra note 9.
305. Id.
306. See E. BORCHARD, supra note 246 at 14.
307. STOWELL, supra note 222 at 51-52.
308. Id. at 52 n.8.
309. Id. at 52 n.8. "We must admit that international law does not afford any machin-
ery for correcting such occasional abuses." Id.
310. H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RiGHTs 32 (1950).
311. On Oct. 19, 1983, the evening when Grenadian Prime Minister Maurice Bishop
was murdered, Grenadian forces fired randomly into a crowd of Bishop supporters. See
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rather difficult to argue that one such instance would shock the
conscience of a world accustomed to the excesses of the junta in
Argentina or the Khomeini regime in Iran. It should be noted that
the United States did not previosly allege a persistent disregard for
human rights by the Grenadian government. Moreover, it cannot
be said that the actions of the Grenadian regime vis-A-vis its own
citizens were such to outrage or shock the conscience of the world.
Therefore, the United States would be hard pressed to prove the
existence of facts which could justify an intervention based on hu-
manitarian concerns for the Grenadian public. Perhaps the failure
of the United States to rely on this theory of intervention reveals
that it may be uncomfortable arguing such a position. Conse-
quently, if the United States intervention could not be legally jus-
tifiable as an instance of humanitarian intervention to protect
Grenadian citizens, nor as an action to protect endangered U.S. na-
tionals, what legal theory could validate the incident?
Both the United States and the members of the OECS alleged
that the invasion aimed "to put an end to the situation of acute
threat to peace and security to the entire eastern Caribbean re-
gion." '12 Does the existence of a preceived threat to the security of
neighboring states justify an act of intervention? A small minority
of legal theorists argue that an intervention aimed at removing
such a threat is, indeed, legal under international law. The doc-
trine of international nuisance, although not widely accepted,
would justify the U.S. intervention in Grenada. This doctrine is
"built upon the analogy of the common law right to remove a nui-
sance."'8 18 Stowell notes that Professor John Basset Moore adhered
to the view that the U.S. intervention in Cuba in the late nine-
teenth century "rested upon the ground that there existed in Cuba
conditions so injurious that they could no longer be indured. Its
action was analogous to what is known in private law as the abate-
ment of a nuisance." 1' Such interventions were justified by the
French publicist, Alphonse Rivier, who recognized a right to inter-
vene if the security of the intervening State was imperiled by polit-
ical or social conditions or the governance of a neighboring
supra note 8 and accompanying text.
312. Statement of Jeanne J. Kirkpatrick 25 October, 1983 S/PV 2478, 92, 97. See also
Statement of Mr. Moseley (Barbados) 28 October, 1983 SIPV.2491 63, 72.
313. STOWELL, supra note 222 at 62 n.14; see also J.B. MooRE, THE PRINCIPLES OF
AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 208 (1918).
314. J.B. MOORE, supra note 313 quoted in E. STOWELL supra note 222 at 62 n.14.
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State."'
Nevertheless, Rivier suggests that this type of intervention is
valid only where there is a direct and imminent threat to the se-
curity of the intervening State."' Moreover, Rivier notes that the
institution of hostile doctrines or theories of government, which
are perhaps contrary to the intervening State would not justify re-
sort to intervention.1 Rivier, however, legitimizes separate treat-
ment for a situation where a neighboring State is plunged into an-
archy, arguing that in such a case, the intervening State is entitled
to a more expansive right of intervention."' In effect, Rivier sub-
mits that the existence of anarchy may entitle an intervening State
to extend its sovereignty into the territory. 19
The United States and the member States of the OECS have
vehemently argued that a situation of anarchy existed on Grenada
which threatened the peace and security of the entire region.
Whether such a situation existed is, indeed, a question of fact that
may never be resolved. Assuming the existence of such a vacuum
of authority on Grenada, it is quite possible that Rivier's outdated,
little known or accepted theories, could be used as the legal justifi-
cation for the intervention of October, 1983. Rivier's ideas, how-
ever, emanate from an era in which imperialism was firmly en-
trenched, and thus, ring of obsolescence. A rather tenuous
argument could be made to suggest that such notions remain valid,
despite the prohibition on the use of force in article 2(4) of the UN
Charter or the prohibition on intervention provided for in articles
18 and 20 of the OAS Charter. One could argue that the need to
act quickly in situations of impending danger from a neighboring
State plunged into anarchy would preserve the doctrine of interna-
315. "Puis en vertu du droit de conservation, lorsque lea droits et la securit6 de I'ttat
intervenant sont les6s ou mis en peril par la condition politique ou sociale ou par la conduite
de l']tat qui donne lieu a l'intervention." A. RiviER, PRINCIPLES Du DROIT DES GENS 393
(1896).
316. "Ella [l'intervention] eat justifie6 lorsque lea droits et la securit6 de l'Etat interve-
nant sont less ou mis en peril. I faut donc une lesion, opere ou imminente."
317. "Le Seul fait de proclamer des doctrines hostiles ou subversives, ou de se donner
une constitution contraire aux institutions des autres lEtats, ne suffix pas pour justifier
l'intervention, tant qu'il n'y A pas propagande effective et vraiment dangereuse, c'est-&-dire
d'un danger immediat, direct et prochain." Id.
318. "If eat superflu de mentionner l'anarchie parce qu'elle supprime la notion et lea
droits de lktat, et qu'en consequence, en cas d'anarchie, l'intervention d'autres ktats non
seulement serait autoris~e par ta droit de conservation, mais durait meme un caractere dif-
ferent, le caractere d'une quasi-occupation, comrne d'un territoire sans maitre." Id. at 398.
319. Id.
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tional nuisance within the framework of modern, international or-
ganizations. Nevertheless, this argument is significantly weakened
by the fact that Rivier's theory was not widely accepted before the
signing of the UN or OAS Charters, thus how could it gain new
found prominence in today's world? Acceptance of Rivier's ideas
would, in effect, suggest a return to a pre-UN notion of interna-
tional law at least in those regions neighboring today's superpower
States.
E. Realpolitik and the Age of the Superpower
Although clever interpretations of the UN and OAS Charters
may be employed, it appears that the United States action in Gre-
nada was employed without regard for the procedures envisioned
by those documents. Accordingly, one may venture to note that the
U.S. action in Grenada resembled not only the invasion of the Do-
minican Republic in 1965, but perhaps the Soviet actions in Af-
ganistan in 1979, and Czechoslovakia in 1968 as well. Although the
Soviet responses certainly constitute more serious infractions, this
pattern of superpower action illustrates the ineffectiveness of the
United Nations to control the acts of those powerful States in their
perceived spheres of influence. This pattern also suggests that two
standards of conduct have evolved, one which governs superpower
behavior in the international arena, and one to govern less power-
ful States.
It should be noted that such inequity is not a new phenome-
non. Rivier recognized that his theory of intervention based on the
international nuisance would be employed only by powerful States
against weaker members of the international community of
States.' " Yet Rivier wrote in the pre-United Nations era, before
such notions as the equality of States and respect for territorial
sovereignty bound the community of nations. Indeed, it would
seem that each superpower acts more as a realpolitiker than a
member of the United Nations. The actions of both superpowers,
as aptly demonstrated most recently by the United States in Gre-
nada, suggest adherence to policies based on the realities of na-
tional interest and power, in effect, policies based on realpolitik
320. "[ojn ne concerrait guerb un ]tat faible intervenant dans lei affaries interieures
d'un Etat fort. . . ." Id. at 401.
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and not the lofty principles of equality of States as manifested in
the United Nations Charter.
JON M. KARAS
JERALD M. GOODMAN**
** The authors would like to thank the following students who acted as research assist-
ants for this comment: Ervin Gonzalez, Mark Klingensmith, Beth Liebman, Allen Popper
and Gary Rosenblum.
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